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1 Introduction
Internationally active firms represent only a small fraction of all firms. Nevertheless,
above average performance implies that their impact on aggregate economic activity
is much larger than their number suggests. Using US data for the year 2000, Bernard
et al. (2009) find that trading firms, a mere 4.1% of all firms, accounted for as much
as 41.9% of employment outside government and education.1 In the light of these
findings, and spurred by the increasing availability of firm-level data, a major puzzle
from macroeconomics has recently reemerged and come under the scrutiny of micro-
data analysis: why have exchange rates so little effect on the real economy?2
A large body of literature, dealing with the exchange rate disconnect, has revealed
that much of the puzzle can be traced back to incomplete pass-through of exchange
rates into prices.3 Thus, a devaluation of the dollar does not necessarily imply cheaper
US imports for the rest of the world and accordingly no expenditure adjustments. The
focus on firms’ sourcing behavior can be seen as the latest addition to this literature.
It is driven by the insight that internationally active firms are often exporting final
goods and importing intermediate goods at the same time.4 If both flows are de-
nominated in the same currency, an appreciation, usually increasing the price tag on
foreign sales, also implies higher purchasing power with respect to intermediate in-
puts. This reduction in costs helps firms to counter the increase in prices of goods
sold in the foreign market, effectively preventing changes in foreign sales.
Adding to this branch of literature, this paper provides new firm-level evidence
from European manufacturing firms, supporting the hypothesis that the missing link
between exchange rates and the real economy is partly due to imports of intermediate
goods. Yet, in difference to earlier results, I find the mechanism of offsetting exchange
rate effects to hold for a subset of firms only. Specifically, I analyze to what extent ex-
port and intermediate import flows are denominated in the same currency and find
1Bernard et al. (2009), tables 14.1 and 14.3.
2See Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) for an explicit formulation of that puzzle.
3See Goldberg and Knetter (1997) and Burstein and Gopinath (2014) for reviews of the literature.
Classical explanations for this inelasticity of prices include price rigidities in the local currency
(e.g. Gopinath and Rigobon (2008)), firms adjusting the profit margin (e.g. Atkeson and Burstein
(2008)) and local-currency distribution costs (e.g. Goldberg and Campa (2010)).
4Bernard et al. (2009) find that of the 41.9% of US workers employed in trading firms, about 73% are
employed in firms that are both exporters and importers (compare Bernard et al. (2009), table 14.1).
As a study by the OECD for 2006 confirms, intermediate imports are thereby the dominant trade
flows in OECD countries, representing 56% of the total trade in goods and 73% of the total trade in
services. (compare Miroudot et al. (2009)).
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that for many firms the alignment appears to be rather weak or even negative. This
has important implications: if the exchange rate with respect to exporting regions
moves independently from the exchange rate with respect to sourcing regions, the
offsetting effect described above disappears. If exchange rates are negatively related,
the effect of exchange rates on export sales is reinforced through intermediate im-
ports. This is what I find for the average exporting firm in my sample.
From the macro perspective, this is an important finding because it implies that the
link between intermediate imports and the exchange rate disconnect puzzle is specific
to only a subset of importing firms, namely those with a positive alignment of export
and intermediate import related exchange rates. Amiti et al. (2014) conceptually ac-
knowledge this limitation, but, because they do not consider the full distribution of
the measure of co-movement, their approach does not bring to light its empirical sig-
nificance. To my knowledge, the present paper is the first to put the co-movement of
exchange rates in the foreground.
The following analysis addresses two questions related to the effects of interme-
diate imports on the rate of exchange rate pass-through. The first part of the paper
determines the offsetting effect of intermediate imports on the exchange rate pass-
through into total sales, contingent on the co-movement of exchange rates. Techni-
cally, this part is closely related to the exchange rate disconnect literature. The second
part of the paper asks whether exporters take into account the co-movement of ex-
change rates when deciding on sourcing regions. It connects to the hedging literature
and, to my knowledge, is the first approach of addressing this question in a system-
atical manner.
In order to guide the empirical specification for the first part, I propose a stylized
theoretical framework where demand is derived from standard CES preferences and
firms set prices with a fixed markup over marginal cost. Marginal costs are deter-
mined by the composition of domestic and foreign inputs and firms can sell their
output at home and abroad.5 Partially differentiating the expression for sales with
respect to the export weighted exchange rate leads to a simple structural estimation
equation. For exporting firms, the structure predicts a positive association between
sales and the foreign currency value. A potentially countervailing association is estab-
lished when the firm is offshoring, i.e. purchasing inputs from abroad. A devaluation
of the export related exchange rate then implies increasing input costs, provided that
5As my data does not provide information on the evolution of exports and imported inputs over
time, I assume the optimal import and export decision to be sunk at the time of observation.
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the co-movement between export and intermediate import related exchange rates is
positive.
I estimate the equation for log-changes in sales over the years 2004 to 2013, us-
ing a large sample of manufacturing firms from seven European countries, including
France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK.6 The dependent variable is regressed on
log-changes in the real effective exchange rate as well as interactions with the share of
exports in total sales and the share of imported intermediates in total intermediates,
i.e. offshoring. Following the literature, the effective exchange rate is constructed as a
trade weighted geometric average of bilateral exchange rates, where weights are cho-
sen according to export flows at the industry level. Because I expect the coefficient on
the offshoring interaction to be contingent on the co-movement between the export
and intermediate import weighted exchange rates, I add a triple interaction with a
corresponding measure.7
I find the results to be in line with the theoretical predictions. Specifically, ex-
porting firms on average face higher demand after a devaluation of the domestic
currency. The effect is countered by imported intermediates if the co-movement be-
tween export and import weighted exchange rates is high enough. The coefficients
of interest have the expected sign and are statistically significant. This implies that,
for exporters, offshoring can in principle have a dampening effect on the exchange
rate elasticity of sales. My data thus confirms earlier findings, showing that multiple
foreign operations have the potential to provide an operational hedge against the ex-
change rate uncertainty facing exporters. Yet, different from earlier studies, I find the
co-movement of exchange rates to be too low for the average firm in my sample. As
pointed out earlier, importing intermediates then reinforces the exchange rate effects
due to exporting.
In terms of economic significance, my findings suggest that doubling the average
sample rate of exchange rate devaluation from 0.3% to 0.6% increases the growth
rate of sales by about 8.8% for the average non-offshoring exporter. For the average
offshoring exporter, the corresponding increase more than doubles to 18.5%. Thus,
6Different from earlier studies that relied on price-level or export data, the structure I propose is built
upon firm-level variables that are easily available. This enhances the applicability to different data
sources considerably.
7Note that the industry weights used in the construction of the intermediate import weighted ex-
change rate are chosen according to imports at the input industry level, using Input-Output (IO)
coefficients to determine the importance of each input industry in the firm’s output industry. For
simplicity, I will use the terms import weighted exchange rate and intermediate import weighted
exchange rates interchangeably.
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instead of offsetting the effect of exchange rates on sales working through exports,
offshoring appears to reinforce it on average. I find offshoring to work as a hedging
device only for firms that, by purpose or luck, choose an offshoring region with high
hedging potential, i.e. a high co-movement between export weighted and interme-
diate import weighted exchange rate. Thus, the best possible hedging region, with a
co-movement indicator at the 99th percentile, completely offsets the export effect on
sales with an import share of only 7%, while the same amount of offhoring can in-
crease the export effects by more than 73% if the co-movement indicator is very low,
i.e. at the 1st percentile.
In the hedging literature, it has long been recognized that the exchange rate expo-
sure of firms is effectively reduced when the firm engages in multiple international
activities. The underlying mechanism has often been referred to as natural hedging.8
As the term natural suggests, the hedging effect is implicitly assumed to work through
random diversification. For existing empirical studies, this assumption was usually
sensible, given that most of them are dealing with data on large multinationals. But
in the light of the results described above, the assumption needs to be qualified when
small and medium-sized firms with limited international activity are concerned. For
the average exporting firm in my sample intermediate imports tend to reinforce the
effects of exchange rates, thereby increasing exchange rate exposure. This implies
that most firms willing to engage in operational hedging9 activities will have to care-
fully consider the exchange rate characteristics of export and sourcing regions.
This consequently provokes a question that has been barely addressed in the liter-
ature: do firms take into account the hedging potential when choosing an offshoring
region?10 Anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that they do.11
8See Clark (1973) for an early formulation of the natural hedging hypothesis.
9Because my findings suggest that hedging requires a non-random choice of sourcing regions for
most firms, I will refer to operational hedging instead of natural hedging from now on.
10Amiti et al. (2014) indirectly approach the issue by determining whether the co-movement between
export and import weighted exchange rates at the firm level is increasing in import intensity. Find-
ing no significant relationship, they conclude that hedging is not systematic. Yet they do not ad-
dress the choice of sourcing countries explicitly.
11In its annual report 2007, German car manufacturer BMW explicitly proclaims that "[f]rom a strate-
gic point of view, i.e. in the medium and long term, the BMW Group endeavors to manage foreign
exchange risks by ’natural hedging’, in other words by increasing the volume of purchases denom-
inated in foreign currency or increasing the volume of local production." (BMW Group Annual
Report 2007, p. 63). Similar intentions are expressed in the annual reports of Toyota (2007, p.77)
and Volkswagen (2009, p.188). While these very large multinationals are not representative of the
manufacturing sector, a survey conducted by the Canadian export credit agency EDC among 260
exporters suggests that operational hedging might actually be relevant to a large number of ex-
porters. The authors of the report note that "[a]lthough, natural hedging is an important tactic for
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In order to address this question more formally, in the second part of this paper I
regress regional offshoring choices on regional exports and their interaction with ex-
change rate characteristics. Regional exports are included as an indicator of exchange
rate exposure and because, keeping constant regional characteristics, sunk cost of re-
gional entry and network effects would predict that firms should be relatively more
willing to import from a region that they already know. Nevertheless, if the region is
highly volatile in terms of exchange rates and if firms dislike exchange rate volatility,
then even regional exporters might not like to source from that region. Again, these
results are contingent on the co-movement between import and export weighted ex-
change rates. If this co-movement is low for a given region, sourcing would reinforce
the volatility effect of exports and, controlling for other area specific effects, firms
would be wise to import from other regions. But once the co-movement exceeds a
certain level, the high volatility of exchange rates can be effectively hedged through
intermediate imports. Because higher volatility implies a higher risk level, I would
then expect firms to be relatively eager to match exports with intermediate imports
from a given region.
The analysis delivers results that are in line with these predictions. As expected, the
data suggests that the probability of importing from a region is, on average, higher
for regional exporters. Thus, ignoring any exchange rate risks, exporting increases
the probability of importing by 15.9 percentage points. Factoring in the average level
of exchange rate volatility significantly reduces this effect to 4.3 percentage points for
an average level of co-movement between the export and the intermediate import
weighted exchange rate. Thus, firms tend to avoid exchange rate risks. But addi-
tionally, the sourcing decision depends critically on the indicator of exchange rate
co-movement. Accordingly, the positive effect of regional exports on regional im-
ports increases to 7 percentage points in regions with high co-movement of exchange
rates (90th percentile) but decreases to 2 percentage points for regions with low co-
movement (10th percentile). The effects are more pronounced in high volatility re-
gions (75th percentile of the volatility distribution), where an exporters facing high
co-movement of exchange rates tends to be 4.2 percentage points more likely than a
non-exporter to source from that region, whereas firms facing low co-movement tend
firms of all sizes, [...] small firms are particularly drawn to the use of natural hedging strategies."
Overall, the report finds almost 60% of the respondents to engage in operational hedging activi-
ties (EDC (2009), p.6.). The report defines natural hedging as the attempt "to match revenues in a
foreign currency with payments in that same foreign currency." Note also that Friberg and Huse
(2014) derive counterfactual profit distributions for BMW and Porsche and find that operational
hedging reduces exchange rate exposure.
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to be on average 3.5 percentage points less likely. These findings represent a clear pat-
tern in the choice of importing regions that is in line with the mechanisms explained
above. I interpret them as evidence for directed operational hedging.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 summarizes the related
literature. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework. Section 4 introduces data
sources, key variables and discusses the empirical identification. Section 5 presents
estimation results for the theoretical framework. Section 6 introduces the estimation
equation for local sourcing and discusses the results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The paper connects two strands of the literature that have so far been developed apart
from each other. On the one hand, there is a recent literature that focuses on imports
and global value chains in order to explain the exchange rate disconnect puzzle. On
the other hand, there is a branch of the finance literature that deals with the exchange
rate exposure of multinationals and discusses reasons and means to deal with it.12
Both strands have provided evidence suggesting that international sourcing is effec-
tively hedging the exchange rate risk of exporters. Accordingly, the question arises
whether firms might be actively directing their international activities towards hedg-
ing opportunities. This paper adds to both strands of the literature, providing new
evidence for effective and directed operational hedging in the European manufactur-
ing sector.
The first part of the paper relates to the pass-through literature with its recent focus
on imported intermediates. This literature is looking at price adjustments in response
to exchange rate variations and usually requires highly detailed data on prices or
volumes. The analysis then follows from a structural decomposition of prices into
markups and marginal costs. Proceeding this way, Athukorala and Menon (1994)
use Japanese industry-level data and find evidence for an indirect effect of exchange
rates on export prices that is operating through the cost of imported inputs. Goldberg
and Hellerstein (2008) review empirical work and find that after accounting for the
variation in markups, structural models of pass-through tend to produce substantial
residual variation that could be due to movements in marginal costs. Fauceglia et al.
12Note that this paper also relates to a literature that examines the relation between exchange rate
volatility and trade flows. It is surveyed in McKenzie (1999) and Clark et al. (2004) and I will
briefly return to it in section 6.
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(2012) use Swiss industry-level data and find high pass-through rates of exchange
rates into import prices, concluding that importing intermediates potentially allows
exporters to benefit from operational hedges.
But while these studies have confirmed the role of imported intermediates for pass-
through at the sectoral level, evidence at the firm level remains relatively sparse. Us-
ing French firm-level data, Berman et al. (2012) estimate a pass-through regression at
the firm level and find that importing firms increase their prices more than others in
response to a devaluation. While they attribute this effect to a rise in input costs, the
underlying mechanisms are not formally addressed and their analysis remains silent
about the relationship between export and import weighted exchange rates. Amiti
et al. (2014) develop and test a structural model of variable markups at the firm level
that explicitly accounts for the role of imported intermediates and the co-movement
between export and import weighted exchange rates. They find imported intermedi-
ates to significantly reduce pass-through rates in their sample of Belgian firms.
My work is closely related to the approach of Amiti et al. (2014), given that they an-
alytically introduced the role of exchange rate co-movement for pass-through rates at
the firm level in their theoretical model. Empirically though, these authors consider
only very few points of the underlying distribution. In difference to their empirical
approach, I add a further interaction that explicitly accounts for the co-movement
between import and export weighted exchange rates, allowing the measure to vary
continuously across firms. As shown in section 5, my results are analytically still
in line with the earlier study, but for the average firm, the implications for hedging
are now completely reversed. In a further difference from these authors, I measure
pass-through into total sales instead of prices. This allows me to substantially ex-
tend the analysis to several countries but implies that price and volume adjustments
remain closely entangled. Accordingly, I abstract from markup heterogeneity in the
structural model.13
The paper is also closely related to Greenaway et al. (2010). Similar to the approach
presented here, they focus on (export) sales rather than prices. Using data on UK
manufacturing firms, they find an appreciation to reduce exports. Furthermore, they
find an offsetting effect through imported intermediates. They also distinguish export
and import weighted measures of the exchange rate but do not account for exchange
rate co-movements. Furthermore, their measure of offshoring is not firm specific.14
13Note that this in theory implies a complete pass-through for firms that source domestically only.
Empirically, I will add markup controls in order to allow for heterogeneous pricing-to-market.
14The role of imported inputs for pass-through is also confirmed in recent findings at the macro-level.
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The second part of the paper shifts the focus towards the notion of exchange rate
exposure. This concept originates from the business and finance literature and pro-
vides the basis for most of the hedging analysis. Authors like Heckerman (1972) and
Shapiro (1975) define exposure as the sensitivity of the firm value to changes in the
exchange rate. Among others, Jorion (1990) and Bodnar and Gentry (1993) have there-
fore used stock market values to assess the exchange rate exposure of multinational
firms. Because these studies struggle to find significant effects, Bartov and Bodnar
(1994) propose that the net exposure of multinationals depends on the relative size of
foreign costs and revenues and that failure to measure exposure might be the result
of offsetting cash flows. Using data on 409 US multinationals, Choi and Prasad (1995)
provide evidence consistent with the idea.15
Accordingly, some authors have acknowledged the role of internationalization as a
hedging device.16 That firms actively determine their international activities accord-
ing to operational hedging potential has, to my knowledge, only been addressed in
theoretical contributions. Thus, Broll (1992) derives a model of risk averse multina-
tionals and finds that, in the absence of forward markets, profit maximization leads
to active operational hedging. Chowdhry and Howe (1999) show that operational
hedging can be efficient even in a world with fixed quantity forward contracts, as
the alignment of revenues and costs allows for flexible exchange rate hedges that are
contingent upon sales in the foreign country. Empirically, most of the literature has fo-
cused on the relation between financial and operational hedges. Operational hedges
are mostly treated as the result of predetermined geographic diversification rather
Thus, Ahmed et al. (2015) and Ollivaud et al. (2015) document a significant drop in the elasticity
of aggregate manufacturing exports to the real effective exchange rate over the last two decades.
They propose the expansion of global value chains as one of the major reasons for that change
over time. Note that while the literature has proposed various determinants of low levels of pass-
through, global value chains are especially suitable when it comes to explaining a change in recent
years. Note also that Leigh et al. (2015) do not share the view of an increasing disconnect at the
macro level but acknowledge the role of international production fragmentation in explaining a
low pass-through of exchange rates into export prices.
15See Muller and Verschoor (2006) and Bartram et al. (2010) for more recent results on the determinants
of exchange rate exposure.
16The question of whether and why firms hedge against exchange rate risks is not the focus of the
present analysis but has been covered in several papers. Dumas (1978) introduces market imper-
fections such as capital market segmentation or bankruptcy costs in order to restore the relevancy
of the financial hedging decision. Rodriguez (1981) presents results from interviews with financial
officers of US multinationals and suggests that risk aversion might play an important role when
it comes to exchange rate hedging. Mayers and Smith (1982) provide a more general discussion
of corporate demand for insurance. A short overview of alternative theoretical assumptions that
justify hedging activities is given Mian (1996).
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than a specific match of import and export weighted exchange rates.17 Thus, none
of these papers provides evidence for firms actually choosing locations according to
hedging potential. Additionally, because exposure is measured through changes in
stock values, most of the literature has focused on large multinationals and fails to
acknowledge the role of operational hedging for a broader set of firms.
3 Theoretical Framework
In order to guide the empirical specification, I propose a stylized Dixit-Stiglitz frame-
work of internationally active firms. Using CES preferences keeps the structural equa-
tions tractable, but still flexible enough to provide useful predictions on the relation
between exports, offshoring and exchange rate exposure.18
I define marginal costs to be a simple weighted average of domestic and foreign
wages, with i representing the firm specific but exogenous physical imported in-
put share and Ei representing the import weighted exchange rate in price notation
(E€/$):
19
17Examples include Houston and Mueller (1988) who note that more geographical diversification
should tend to reduce the need for hedging but find no evidence for that effect in data on US
multinationals. Makar et al. (1999) and Allayannis et al. (2001) also use measures of geographic
diversification as a proxy for operational hedges and assess the effect of dispersion on the financial
hedging decisions of firms. While the former find operational hedging to substitute for financial
hedges, the latter find both types of hedges to be complementary. Pantzalis et al. (2001) show that
operational hedging in terms of breadth and depth of the multinational network lowers exchange
rate exposure after controlling for the presence of financial hedges. Ito et al. (2015) focus on the
relationship between the choice of invoicing currencies and both, the need and effectiveness of fi-
nancial and operational hedges. A summary of the hedging literature with a focus on Europe can
be found in Döhring (2008), who points out that operational hedges, involving high sunk costs, are
typically used to reduce longer-term exposure to economic risk, while transaction risk can be easily
hedged using standard financial products. In general, the literature distinguishes transaction risk,
economic risk and translation risk. While transaction risk refers to the impact of exchange rates on
committed cash flows, economic risk refers to uncertain future cash flows. Translation risk refers
to the impact of exchange rates on the valuation of assets and liabilities denominated in a foreign
currency. Compare e.g. Döhring (2008). Recent survey evidence regarding hedging from a sample
of 804 Swedish firms is presented in Amberg and Friberg (2015).
18Note that in this framework the costs of imported intermediates remain the sole determinant of the
exchange rate pass-through into exporter prices, because a constant elasticity of demand effectively
fixes the markup, muting any pricing-to-market effects. Compare e.g. Goldberg and Hellerstein
(2008).
19All values are measured in local currency and multiplied with the corresponding exchange rate
where necessary. Thus, foreign labor costs w$ are expressed in Dollars and need to be multiplied
by the intermediate import-weighted exchange rate in order to enter the domestic marginal cost
formula which is expressed in Euros.
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MC ≡ (1 − i)w€ + iw$Ei (1)
Given marginal costs, we can write domestic and foreign prices in the usual markup
formulation:
p€ = µ · MC (2)




where µ is the markup, τ represents iceberg trade costs and Ex is the export weighted
exchange rate. Note that the markup is determined by the fixed elasticity of substitu-
tion σ.
The total sales equation can be written in the standard Dixit-Stiglitz notation:











where rj and Ωj resemble firm revenues and GDP respectively in country j, and Pj
is the country specific price aggregator, all measured in local currency.
Partially differentiating equation (4) with respect to the export weighted exchange
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where the ǫr captures general equilibrium adjustments in domestic and foreign
aggregate demand and IS is the share of imported intermediates in value terms.20
This equation has an intuitive interpretation and could, in principal, be directly
estimated. Specifically, equation (5) shows that the change in total revenues due to






$ ). This is going to be the error term in the empirical specification and is
explicitly formulated in section A.1.1 of the appendix. The share of imported intermediates in





a devaluation of the domestic currency is composed of two effects.21 The first term
on the right hand side is the direct effect. It is positive and implies that total sales
increase after a devaluation when the firm is exporting (r$ > 0). This term cap-
tures both, the positive effect on foreign sales that is due to the lower conversion of
domestic prices into foreign currency, and a second effect that is due to the higher
conversion of foreign revenues into domestic currency. The second term captures the
indirect effect of importing. It is indirect, because here we are looking at changes in
the export weighted exchange rate. Thus, the indirect effect crucially depends on the
elasticity of the import with respect to the export weighted exchange rate, as only the
former has an effect on the cost of imported intermediates. Furthermore, it depends
on the absolute importance of inputs denominated in foreign currency, measured by
the import intensity times the total value of sales. The effect is negative whenever
the co-movement of exchange rates is positive, given that the elasticity of substitu-
tion is larger than one and it captures the effect of higher material cost on foreign and
domestic sales. Note further that the absolute size of both effects is increasing in σ,
because a higher price elasticity of demand implies that the decrease in prices caused
by the conversion effect and the increase in prices due to higher marginal cost both
result in larger demand and therefore sales adjustments.22
Equation (5) requires data on export sales over time. Unfortunately, my dataset
contains information on total sales only. In principle, I could easily construct the time
varying equivalent for exports, assuming that the export share, that relates only to
2008 in the data, remains valid over the full period. Instead, I propose a small trans-
formation that, while still depending on the same assumption, allows me to express
the equation directly in terms of the export share. This provides for a better fit with




= σ · XS ·
∆Ex
Ex









21Note that a devaluation of the domestic currency corresponds to an increase in Ex. A more detailed
decomposition of the effects is provided in section A.1.1 of the appendix.
22Defining equation (5), I implicitly assumed σ to be the same across countries for the sake of sim-
plicity. It is straightforward to allow different sigmas at home (σ€) and abroad (σ$). In this case,
the sigma of the the first term on the right hand side of equation (5) would be the foreign price
elasticity (σ$), while the σ of the second term would be a trade weighted average of the domestic
and the foreign elasticity. The basic intuition would remain the same.
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where XS is the export share.23
Finally, I am going to reformulate equation (6) in terms of real exchange rates, ac-
knowledging that a change in the foreign price index relative to the domestic price
index should have effects that work through the same channels as a change in the
nominal exchange rate. While the derivation for the nominal exchange rate provides
a helpful conceptional starting point, from the firm perspective it should not matter
whether sales deteriorate due to a nominal appreciation or worsening terms of trade,
induced for example by diverging rates of productivity growth across countries. Note
that in difference to most financial hedging devices, operational hedging delivers a
unique opportunity for firms to hedge against movements in real exchange rates.
Thus, in order to determine the hedging potential of offshoring, it is worthwhile to
consider the full range of macro-economic risks that the typical exporting firm is fac-
ing. Adjusting the equation for movements in real exchange rates is straightforward
and leads to the following equation:24
∆rtot
rtot
= σ · XS ·
∆Rx
Rx









The error term ǫ now contains additional elements capturing the general equilib-
rium adjustments in the sectoral terms of trade. As with the demand shifters, these
effects are firm specific because the exposure to the sectoral terms of trade effects with
respect to exporting or importing countries depends on the export and the import in-
tensity of the firm.25
Equation (7) can be directly estimated, assuming that the export and import de-
cisions are fixed over time. This is a major simplification but necessary due to the
restrictions of my data.




24The equation follows from (6) by replacing Ei with Ri ∗ (P€/P$), acknowledging that the relative
price P̂ ≡ P€/P$ is itself a function of the real exchange rate and partially differentiating with
respect to Rx.
25See equation (A.2) in the appendix for an explicit formulation.
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4 Data Description, Key Variables and Identification
4.1 Data Sources and Construction of Key Variables
Firm-level data stems from two data sources: the EU-EFIGE/Bruegel-UniCredit (EFIGE)
survey and Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus database. The EFIGE survey is at the core of
the analysis as it defines the firm sample. Coordinated by the European think tank
Bruegel and supported by the Directorate General Research of the European Commis-
sion, the full EFIGE sample encompasses almost 15.000 firms of the manufacturing
sector in seven European countries: Germany, France, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom,
Austria and Hungary.26 The survey focus lies on the international activity of firms.
Data was collected in 2010 and covers the years from 2007 to 2009. However, most
information is cross-sectional and only available for the year 2008. From EFIGE I ob-
tain the share of imported intermediates in total intermediates, the share of turnover
exported as well as information on the regional structure of firms’ international ac-
tivities as of 2008. The EFIGE survey restricts regional information to the area level.27
The destination area specific information will become important for the empirical ex-
ercise in section 6.
I match the firms from the EFIGE survey with Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus database.
This allows me to add balance sheet data for the years 2005 to 2013 as well as detailed
information on a firm’s industry class. Especially, I obtain total sales in every year, as
well as a range of other balance sheet variables that I use as controls or alternative de-
pendent variables.28 The sectoral details enable me to add industry specific exchange
rates to the firm panel.
Industry, country and area specific real effective exchange rates for the years 2004
to 2013 are constructed from four additional data sources: Average monthly nomi-
nal exchange rates of the Euro against a range of other currencies are obtained from
Eurostat. From these I derive bilateral exchange rates also with respect to the Forint
and the Pound Sterling. I index all bilateral exchange rates with respect to the rate of
26The survey is representative in terms of the firm-size distribution at the country level for firms with
more than 10 employees in the manufacturing industry. See Altomonte and Aquilante (2012) and
Altomonte et al. (2012) for more details.
27EFIGE splits the world into eight areas: EU15, other EU, other Europe not EU, China & India, other
Asia, USA & Canada, Central & South America and other areas. See Altomonte and Aquilante
(2012) for a full list of countries and table A.1 in the appendix for a list of the countries used in the
empirical analysis.
28A list of all variables used is provided in table A.2 in the appendix. The appendix also provides
summary statistics for most variables in tables A.3 and A.4.
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January 2004. I use seasonally adjusted nominal CPI data from World Bank’s Global
Economic Monitor, again indexed with respect to January 2004, in order to transform
nominal into real exchange rates. The effective exchange rates are obtained by geo-
metrically weighting the bilateral exchange rates according to the trade flow structure
in a given industry with respect to a specific region of international activity.29 The
trade flow data is obtained from the WITS/Comtrade database and averaged over
the years 2005 to 2007. I construct the export weighted and an intermediate import
weighted real exchange rate at the two digit level (ISIC Rev.3). Intermediate import
trade flows are linked to the firms’ output industry using the two-digit Input-Output
coefficients from the OECD Stan database as weights and arithmetically averaging
over all input industries.30
Equations 8 and 9 formalize how the export weighted real effective exchange rate
(Rx) and the intermediate import weighted real effective exchange rate (Ri) are con-
















) ∑z∈IO(s) ςzs ·IMckz
∑k∈κ ∑z∈IO(s) ςzs ·IMckz
(9)
where k ∈ κ is the set of trading partners of country c in region κ, Eckt is the price
of country k’s currency in terms of country c’s currency at time t (i.e. the nominal
exchange rate in price notation), cpict is the consumer price index in country c, EXcks
are average industry s exports from country c to country k in industry s, IMckz are
average sector z imports from country c to country k, where z ∈ IO(s) is the set of
input industries z related to industry s via IO-coefficients ςzs.
29Geometric weighting is the usual approach for the construction of effective exchange rates. Differ-
ent from arithmetic averages, percentage movements in a geometrically averaged index will not
depend on whether the bilateral rates are expressed in price or quantity notation. They are also
more robust to changes in the base period. Compare e.g. Ellis (2001). See table A.1 in the appendix
for details on the final currency basket.
30I apply the German IO-coefficients for the year 2005 to all countries for simplicity.
31For the specification that results from the theoretical framework presented in section 3, I will define
the relevant currency basket with respect to the world. In section 6 I will use effective exchange
rates that are specific to a certain area of international activity, i.e. that contain only those currencies
used in a specific EFIGE export destination or import sourcing area.
15
These real effective monthly exchange rates are then used to determine the covari-
ance of exchange rates for a specific region κ and finally (arithmetically) averaged in
order to obtain yearly exchange rates that can be matched to the firm-level data. I
approximate the theoretical elasticity capturing the co-movement of exchange rates











I use this country and sector specific elasticity as a proxy for the unobserved firm
specific elasticity. Looking at the summary statistics for the implied correlation be-
tween export and import weighted exchange rates yields a mean coefficient of 0.90,
with the minimum around 0.59. While this might be reasonable at the sector level,
at the firm level one would expect the correlation to be much lower or even negative
for some firms. I therefore demean the projection coefficient defined in equation (10)
and use P̂roj
didx
csκ instead, which is centered around zero.
33 This has the additional ad-
vantage of substantially diminishing the amount of collinearity in the model. Thus,
when regressing the triple interaction with offshoring and the projection coefficient
on all other explanatory variables in the baseline specification, using the demeaned
version of Projdidxcsκt reduces the variance inflation factor (VIF) from 60 to 1.9.
4.2 Discussion of the Empirical Strategy
The theoretical structure represented by equation (7) can be directly translated into











+ αi + ... + ǫcsit︸ ︷︷ ︸
ǫr
(11)
The main variation in regression equation (11) stems from log-changes in the coun-
try, sector and year specific real exchange rate. As Goldberg and Hellerstein (2008)
point out, the advantage of using exchange rate data is that they provide a source
32In order to obtain the variance and covariance of the exchange rates, I use variation over 120 dif-
ferent points in time (12 month in each of the 10 years). Note that Projdidxcsκ has no time dimension.














33Note that the proxy variable assumptions actually require a proxy variable to be mean zero in the
population when it is used in an interaction term. Compare Wooldridge (2010), pp. 74-76.
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of large and plausibly exogenous price variation. Additionally, note that the estima-
tion in changes eliminates some of the endogeneity that usually arises in the context
of firm-level survey data. On the downside, identification is restricted to variation
in log-changes which arguably represents only a small fraction of the total variation.
This makes it harder to establish statistically significant results and implies that the
results can only account for a part of the economic significance. Yet, I would argue
that the complexity of the effects involved would render it almost impossible to de-
rive useful conclusions from a level regression that, though capturing more of the
variation, would impede a structural interpretation.
Note that while the proposed theoretical structure is rather simple, the resulting
empirical specification requires higher-dimensional interaction terms, on top of all
the level effects, in order to identify the underlying mechanisms. As much of the
identification depends on the proper translation of the theoretical into the empirical
model, it is important to point out assumptions and simplifications that I impose
when estimating equation (11). In this section, I will therefore discuss the potential
problems arising from each. Most notably, note that I assume the export and import
decisions to be firm specific but fixed parameters of the model and that I treat the
markup that firms set over marginal costs to be the same for all firms and constant
over time.
The assumption of fixed export and import decisions is due to data limitations. As
pointed out before, variables of international activity are time invariant snapshots
from the 2008 EFIGE survey and thus the assumption is necessary. At least the as-
sumption of fixed import shares might not be too restrictive, as Amiti et al. (2014)
find the import share to be empirically very persistent over time. Thus, they treat
the offshoring decision as fixed in most specifications. Yet the assumption is a critical
one and I will address potential endogeneity arising from it through the inclusion of
sector- and country-specific year dummies. Inasmuch as the potential adjustments
of export and import shares over time follow a sector specific trend, the fixed effects
should account for a substantial part of the confounding effects.
The assumption of fixed markups is simplifying the theoretical framework consid-
erably. Because I do not have price-level data, the structural equations are derived
for aggregate variables, implying that the markup and marginal cost channels are
blurred by mixing up price and quantity adjustments as well as domestic and foreign
demand components.34 Including variable markups into the structural model would
34Note that Amiti et al. (2014) use export price data, which allows them to conceptually split price
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therefore substantially increase the complexity of the empirical model and render the
distinction and identification of the hedging effects of offshoring less viable. As this
is the channel least studied in the pass-through literature, I decided to keep the struc-
ture as focused on the import channel as possible. Still, because firm size, markups
and international activity tend to be highly correlated, it is important to acknowledge
the potential endogeneity arising from markup adjustments and to think about the
impact it might have on my estimates.
A good starting point is the paper by Berman et al. (2012). The authors find that in
models of heterogeneous pricing-to-market the high productivity firms usually adjust
their markups more in response to exchange rate movements than low productivity
firms, because the perceived demand elasticity is higher for the latter. Accordingly,
when faced with a real devaluation, exporters will increase the markup and this effect
will be stronger for more productive firms. For offshoring firms the opposite should
hold. For them, a real devaluation implies higher marginal costs and therefore higher
prices. Because this reduces demand, these firms will lower their markup in order
to sustain sales. Again, the decrease in markups will be larger for more productive
firms, perceiving demand to be less elastic.
In my framework, the positive effect on sales and the negative effect on sales are
captured in separate interactions, including the export share and the import share
respectively. As more productive firms on average tend to be internationally more
active, I expect both the export and the import share to be larger for more productive
firms and thus, to be positively correlated with the size of the unobserved markup
adjustment. Because the export share interaction captures a positive effect on sales,
it will induce firms to increase the markup, where the increase is going to be larger
for firms with a larger market share. Not controlling for the markup variation should
therefore bias the coefficient on the export interaction downward, as the increase in
markups would tend to lower the positive effect on sales for large exporters. By
the same token, an increase in material cost would force firms to lower the markup,
effectively diminishing the increase in prices and the decrease in sales. Therefore, I
further expect the coefficient on the offshoring interaction to be downward biased.
Overall, omitting to control for markup adjustments should make it more difficult for
me to find significant effects on the interactions of interest.
I add markup and size controls to control for other potential confounding effects
variation into markup and marginal cost variation and reliefs them from accounting for export
intensity.
18
due to markup heterogeneity. Specifically, I use the log-change in total assets to con-
trol for changes in size and add alternative time-varying measures of the markup in
levels. Additionally, I include firm fixed effects to control for the firm specific average
of the sales reaction.
Because this paper is concerned with hedging potential, one obvious omitted factor
in specification (11) is the hedging activity of firms. Effectively insured firms should
be less affected by exchange rate changes and this would tend to diminish the abso-
lute size of my estimates given that hedging would be relatively more frequent among
exporting and offshoring firms. Again, this makes it more difficult to encounter sig-
nificant results. Accordingly, the inclusion of firm fixed effects, controlling for the av-
erage hedging activity, should result in larger coefficients. Additionally, I provide a
specification where I interact my measure of exchange rate movement with a dummy
indicating whether a firm was using foreign exchange rate protection in 2008.
A related potential problem arises because the projection coefficient is derived at
the sectoral level. Effectively, the proxy resembles the average hedging effective-
ness in the firm’s industry. Yet, the fact that it is sector specific implies that there
remains a firm specific residual component of the projection coefficient in the error
term. Following the directed hedging argument, one could argue that this unob-
served component should be positively correlated with the import and the export
share, as internationally more active firms face higher exposure and would thus tend
to adjust sourcing regions in order to increase the co-movement of exchange rates
above the sector average.35 The sector specific projection coefficient would then un-
derestimate the actual projection coefficient for firms with high import and export
shares and the unobserved residual component in the error term would be positive.
In the error term, this component would show up in various terms. Among others,
in a simple interaction with offshoring. Note though, that this interaction should be
accounted for when firm fixed effects are included. Furthermore, I would expect the
unobserved residual to show up in an interaction with the exchange rate movement.
While this term would probably be positively correlated with the interaction terms
involving the exchange rate movement and exporting and importing respectively, it
is not obvious how the unobserved interaction would affect the change in turnover
35Note that one argument against this potential endogeneity issue could be derived from the findings
of Amiti et al. (2014). They explicitly test for a systematic relationship between the import intensity
and the extent to which firms align import and export regions in their data and fail to find any
supportive evidence. The error component would therefore be random with respect to the share of
imported intermediates and not interfere with my results.
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and therefore the potential bias is difficult to sign. Finally, there is potentially a triple
interaction analogous to the one in the model, inflicting a negative impact on the de-
pendent variable. Due to the positive correlation between the residual component
and international activity, this might lead to a negative bias on both, the coefficients
on the export and offshoring interaction with exchange rates respectively, as well as
the triple interaction. Given the predicted signs of the model, this might cause only
the offshoring interactions to falsely produce significant results. Fortunately, this is
not really a problem, given that the effect in the error term and the resulting bias
is actually part of the effect that I am trying to identify in the first place. Again, I
try to mitigate these effects altogether by including firm fixed effects that should ac-
count for the firm specific projection coefficient, assuming that it is constant over time.
Sector-country-year fixed effects will account for any mismeasurement of the projec-
tion coefficient over time, whenever it is specific to a certain sector. Finally, in some
specifications I will replace the continuous measure of co-movement with a dummy
variable, indicating whether the level of co-movement is above or below the average,
which should reduce the dependence of my results on the finer details of the proxy.
This leaves the structural error term ǫr. Note again that this error term resembles
changes in the dependent variables induced by changes in aggregate variables such
as the domestic and foreign price index and the domestic and foreign demand shifter.
It is firm specific because the weighting of domestic and foreign aggregate changes
depends on firms’ specific composition of domestic and foreign activity. Note that
corresponding terms also form part of the error term in Amiti et al. (2014). Yet, these
are residual effects that remain after controlling for the export and import related in-
teractions that are present in equation (11). Amiti et al. (2014) therefore assume these
factors to be idiosyncratic and mean zero.36 I will follow their assumption but pro-
pose that controlling for firm and sector-country-year fixed effects should eliminate a
large part of any remaining endogeneity.




Table 1 shows the results from different empirical specifications implementing equa-
tion (7).37 Column one ignores the additional interaction with the measure of co-
movement and thus estimates the differential impact of offshoring for the sample-
average co-movement. The negative sign indicates that, if anything, an increase in
the rate of devaluation is slowing down sales growth if the firm is importing interme-
diates. This is in line with the theoretical predictions, though statistically the effect is
indistinguishable from zero. The coefficient on the interaction with the export share
on the other hand is positive and statistically highly significant. Thus, as the theory
predicts, devaluation is positively associated with total sales if the firm is exporting,
because domestic goods become cheaper for foreign consumers. Note further that,
different from the theoretical model, there appears to be an effect from changes in
the exchange rate on total sales growth that is working neither through exports nor
offshoring. The effect is highly significant and probably captures alternative channels
through which exchange rates have an impact on firms. Country-sector fixed effects
are included as I don’t want my results to hinge on certain countries or sectors in the
sample. Thus, if a certain sector faces more volatile demand than another, these fixed
effect would eliminate part of the difference by effectively equalizing average sales
growth across sectors. Additionally, I add year fixed effects in order to control for
shocks in time that equally affected firm sales in all countries and industries.
In specification (2) I add log-changes in total firm assets as a further control. Note
that specification (1) only contains interactions of time-constant firm variables with
the log change in the real effective exchange rate on the right hand side. Any time-
varying firm characteristic that might have an impact on total sales growth is there-
fore captured in the error term. This becomes an issue if such a factor is correlated
with exchange rates or the variables of international activity, because then the coef-
ficients of interest might pick up variation that is not causally related to the import
cost or the export sales channel described by the model. Most notably, total assets
are directly related to what has been called the translation risk of exchange rates.
Following Döhring (2008), this refers to the impact of exchange rate changes on the
valuation of foreign assets. Foreign assets often result from foreign subsidiaries and
37If not indicated otherwise, the specifications are cluster robust at the firm level and contain the full




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆logRxcst -0.464*** -0.154* -0.114 -0.113 -0.161* -0.161
(0.0870) (0.0803) (0.0933) (0.0931) (0.0962) (0.291)
∆logRxcst × XScsi 0.766*** 0.747*** 0.752*** 0.744*** 0.859*** 0.859*** 0.760***
(0.176) (0.157) (0.157) (0.156) (0.165) (0.233) (0.217)
∆logRxcst × IScsi -0.0521 -0.117 0.0677 0.0742 0.160 0.160 0.551**
(0.189) (0.168) (0.180) (0.180) (0.189) (0.237) (0.211)
∆logRxcst × IScsi × P̂roj
didx
cs -2.518** -2.543** -2.939*** -2.939** -2.432*
(1.051) (1.054) (1.121) (1.365) (1.283)
∆log(Assetscsit) no yes yes yes yes yes yes
µcsit no no no yes yes yes yes
Fixed Effects γcs + γt γcs + γt γcs + γt γcs + γt γi + γt γi + γt γi + γcst
Cluster (Firm) yes yes yes yes yes no no
Cluster (Sector#Country) no no no no no yes yes
Nr. of Clusters 9063 9063 9063 9063 8641 177 153
Adj. R2 0.162 0.331 0.331 0.332 0.314 0.314 0.343
Observations 60,169 60,169 60,169 60,169 59,747 59,747 59,491
Notes: Observations relate to firm i in year t, where firms are based in country c and active in sector s.
The dependent variable Salescsit represents total sales of firm i in year t. ∆logR
x
cst are annual log-changes
of the country and sector specific export weighted real effective exchange rate. XScsi and IScsi denote the
firm specific export and import share respectively. P̂roj
didx
cs is the elasticity of the import weighted with
respect to the export weighted real effective exchange rate. µcsit is a markup control defined in the appendix.
∆log(Assetscsit) is the log-change in total assets. γcs are country-sector fixed effects, γt are year fixed effects,
γi are firm fixed effects and γcst are country-sector-year fixed effects. The sector level is defined at the 2-
digit US SIC level. All specifications contain the full set of relevant sub-interaction terms and level effects.
Standard errors are clustered either at the firm level or at the country-sector level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1
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are therefore, at least potentially, directly related to the exporting and offshoring de-
cisions of firms. A devaluation of foreign assets also reduces the financial collateral of
firms and might therefore reduce their capability to invest in an extension of the sales
network. Potentially then, total assets might be confounding the effects observed in
specification (1). Yet, adding log-changes in total assets does not alter the coefficients
of interest substantially. The offshoring coefficient increases somewhat in size but re-
mains insignificant. Note though that the level effect of log-changes in exchange rate
is significantly reduced, both economically and statistically. This indicates that the
asset control is picking up a substantial part of exchange rate effects other than those
related to exports and imports.
Specification (3) introduces the triple interaction with the measure of co-movement
between the export and the intermediate import weighted exchange rate. While the
simple interaction remains insignificant, the coefficient on the triple interaction is neg-
ative as expected and statistically significant at the 5% level. Because the measure of
co-movement is demeaned in the sample, this implies that offshoring has a negligible
effect on the (export weighted) exchange rate pass-through into sales in sectors with
an average level of exchange rate alignment, but counters the positive export effect
when the co-movement between exchange rates in export and import regions is suf-
ficiently high. Thus, the joint location of export and import regions matters for the
hedging potential of imported intermediates.38
In specification (4) I add a time varying markup control defined as total sales over
total cost.39 Though the markup control is highly statistically significant (with a posi-
tive sign), the results do not change much, indicating that the markup control is either
not picking up the relevant variation or markup effects are simply not too important.
I therefore include firm fixed effects in specification (5) to see whether controlling
38While Amiti et al. (2014) also find the marginal cost channel to depend on the correlation of exchange
rates, their offshoring coefficient is always significant and does not change signs even for a low
correlation. Different from their result, my findings suggest that the offshoring effect might actually
enhance the exchange rate effects caused by exporting. One potential reason for the discrepancy
is that they define a low correlation to be everything below 0.7, which is still a relatively high
correlation. I will discuss the heterogeneity of the offshoring effects in more detail below, together
with a discussion of the marginal effects.
39The markup measure is winsorized at 1% due to some very low (zero) and some very high (above a
billion) values. The winsorized measure varies from from 1 to 3.55. There is no significant change
in the results when I completely drop observations where the original markup measure is below
1 or above 5. Alternative measures for the markup, such as total profits over turnover, the log of
total assets or the constant export market share from 2008 (defined in Marin et al. (2014)) deliver
similar results. I also tried adding the markup interacted with the log-change in exchange rates but
the interaction is not significant and other results are practically the same.
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for unobserved heterogeneity in time constant firm characteristics alters my results.40
Controlling for heterogeneity increases both, the coefficient on the export interaction
and the coefficient on the triple interaction, which is now significant at the 1%-level.
As explained earlier, both unobserved market power (not captured by the markup
control) and hedging activities could have biased the previous results towards zero.
Including firm fixed effects eliminates the constant component of these confounding
factors, which would explain the increase of the estimates.
Specification (6) accounts for a slightly more technical problem. Because the ex-
change rate measures are country and industry specific but not firm specific, error
terms are potentially correlated for the firm within a certain country and industry
cluster. I therefore explicitly allow for arbitrary clustering at the country-industry
level in specification (6). Note that this allows error terms to be serially correlated
across years and therefore subsumes the firm clusters used so far. The use of clus-
tered standard errors results in slightly higher standard errors but the coefficients of
interest remain statistically significant.
In specification (7) I retain firm fixed effects and the smaller number of clusters but
replace year fixed effects by country-sector-year fixed effects. Among other things,
these control for any sector specific changes in offshoring, exporting and market
structure and eliminate the level effects of the real effective exchange rate and the
measure of co-movement as well as their interaction. Thus, systematical errors through
aggregation and approximation of exchange rates and their co-movement are better
accounted for. Additionally, the set of fixed effects now controls for the sector and
country specific general equilibrium effects feeding into the structural error term.
Note that the results in specification (7) are now driven exclusively by deviations
over time in the differential effect of exchange rates on sales growth resulting from
offshoring and exporting within a certain country and industry cluster while account-
ing for the average characteristics of firms. Nevertheless, both the export and the
offshoring interaction remain statistically different from zero, though the size of the
coefficients and their significance is slightly reduced.
5.2 Marginal Effects
It is instructive to discuss the meaning of the coefficients in table 1 in terms of the
marginal effects involved. I will refer to specifications (5) and (7) as my baseline and
40I loose some firms due to singleton observations but the change in the estimates is driven by the
firm fixed effects rather than the change in the number of observations.
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my fixed effects specification respectively and present marginal effects for these two
specifications only. Specification (5) contains firm fixed effects, controlling effectively
for unobserved firm level characteristics such as time-invariant productivity or finan-
cial hedging activity. Variation at the level of exchange rates is retained and can be
used for identification. Specification (7) is much stricter in that it eliminates poten-
tial biases arising from the imperfect approximation of the exchange rate measures.
On the downside, some precision of the estimates is lost. In analogy to the fixed
effects, specification (5) adjusts standard errors for clustering at the firm level only,
while specification (7) allows for arbitrary error co-variation within a certain coun-
try and sector. Again, there is a potential trade-off involved. While the larger size
of clusters in specification (7) accounts much better for error correlation, the reduced
number of clusters potentially leads to biased estimates of the variance-covariance
matrix.41 Taken together, these two regressions provide for a good compromise be-
tween precision and bias and I propose that the true effect is in the neighborhood of
these estimates.
As noted earlier, the structural equations presented here describe log-changes in
total sales as a function of log-changes in the exchange rate interacted with firm vari-
ables. Thus effectively, I can only explain changes in growth rates of sales.42 For
example, looking at the average exporting firm, and evaluating marginal effects for
the average non-offshorer with an average projection coefficient, I find that doubling
the sample average of the annual log-change of devaluation from 0.3% to 0.6% in-
creases the rate of sales growth by 8.8% in the baseline and 18.5% in the fixed effects
specification respectively. For the average offshoring firm, the increase in the rate of
sales growth is 10.9% in the baseline and 25.3% in the fixed effects regression. There-
fore, offshoring actually increases the rate of sales growth given an increase in the
rate of devaluation at the average level of co-movement between export and import
weighted exchange rates. This is not in line with the predictions of the model, be-
cause the mean projection coefficient in the sample is positive. But with a positive
projection coefficient, the offshoring effect should counter the export effect and not
reinforce it. Technically, this is due to the sign of the coefficient on the single inter-
action between the rate of devaluation and offshoring. The fact that the sign of this
41Some authors have proposed 50 or more as a rule of thumb for a sufficient number of clusters.
According to this rule, 152 cluster groups appear to be more than enough. Nevertheless, the un-
derlying analysis is based on state-year panel data and the required number of clusters might be
much higher for unbalanced firm-level data. See Colin Cameron and Miller (2015) for a discussion.
42I would argue that the finding of evidence for hedging effects of offshoring at the level of growth
rates is an important indicator of potentially much larger level effects.
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Demeaned Projection Coefficient
Average Offshoring Exporter
Notes: The figure depicts marginal effects at different levels of P̂rojdidxcs , i.e. the measure of co-
movement between export and import weighted real effective exchange rates. Marginal effects
are evaluated for the average exporting firm (TS = 0.32), with the average exporters’ share of
imported intermediates (IS = 0.16). All remaining variables are evaluated at the mean. The
confidence level, depicted by vertical bars along the margins-line, is set to 95%. The marginal
effects relate to specification (7) of table 1.
effect is positive potentially indicates that the sectoral proxy of the projection coeffi-
cient might overestimate the true, firm specific co-movement of exchange rates. If this
unobserved true elasticity was negative for the average firm in the sample, then the
coefficient on the interaction between the rate of devaluation and offshoring should
have a positive sign indeed.
The possibility of the true elasticity being negative on average automatically brings
the question of hedging effects to the foreground again. Apparently, the balancing ef-
fect of offshoring on exchange rate pass-through into sales might not be as obvious as
previous findings suggest. The statistical significance of the triple interaction in table
1 provides evidence for that. It is then easy to see that hedging through offshoring
requires a co-movement between import and export weighted exchange rate that is
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sufficiently high. Figure 1 shows how the marginal effect of a change in the rate of de-
valuation varies with the projection coefficient for the average offshoring exporter.43
It is based on specification (7). At the mid-point of the x-axis, the demeaned projection
coefficient is zero, indicating that this measure is at its sample mean. As noted above,
the marginal effect at this point (0.34) therefore corresponds to an increase in the rate
of sales growth of 25.3%, given a 100% increase in the growth rate of devaluation.
The other points on the x-axis represent different percentiles from the distribution of
the projection coefficient. Going from the midpoint to the right, the marginal effects
depicted in the figure imply that the increase in the rate of sales growth for the aver-
age offshoring exporter is reduced to 23.02% at the 75th. percentile and to 19.9% at
the 90th. percentile. Going to the left, i.e. diminishing the projection coefficient, the
increase in the rate of sales growth becomes 27.1% at the 25th percentile and 31% at
the 10th percentile.
Because in these examples offshoring always reinforces the exchange rate risks of
exporting (up from 18.5%), it is instructive to examine whether it is principally pos-
sible for firms to use offshoring as a hedging instrument after all. In figure A.1 I
therefore depict the marginal effects for various levels of offshoring. I thereby con-
sider the best and the worst pairing of export and import regions in terms of exchange
rate co-movement in my sample. Specifically, I examine the marginal effects at the 1st
and the 99th percentile from the distribution of projection coefficients. This allows me
to consider how large hedging effects can become if firms try to avoid the exchange
rate risks attached to exporting by choosing the origin and share of imported inter-
mediates according to hedging objectives. Furthermore, it shows how offshoring can
dramatically increase exchange rate exposure if import regions are chosen badly in
terms of hedging potential.
Panel A of figure A.1 presents the effects from the baseline specification for the
average exporter. The intercept with the y-axis represents the marginal effect for a
non-offshoring exporter. Using the same hypothetical doubling of the rate of deval-
uation, the marginal effect at this point implies that sales growth is increasing by 7%
for a firm with a projection coefficient at the 99th percentile and 10.3% for a firm at
the 1st percentile.44 Increasing the share of imported intermediates shows how the
43I evaluate at the average export share (32.4%) and import share (16.4%) among all exporting firms
in the sample.
44While the effects from the exchange rate interaction with the export share is identical for both firms,
the difference here is explained by the sub-interactions, specifically the level effect of the exchange
rate and the interaction of the exchange rate with the projection coefficient. This difference is absent
from the fixed effects regression (panel B) because the sub-interactions are absorbed by the fixed
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level of the projection coefficient determines whether offshoring is working as a hedg-
ing device: for the high-elasticity firm, the exchange rate effect through exporting is
completely offset for an import share of only 7%. Instead, if the low elasticity firm
offshores the same amount of intermediates, it increases the effect on sales growth by
more than 73%, with the new effect now representing a 17.9% increase in total sales
growth.
In Panel B, the intercept of both sub-graphs implies that doubling the rate of de-
valuation increases sales growth by 18.5%. The high elasticity firm can completely
offset the devaluation effect through exports with an import share of 29%. But if the
low elasticity firm would source the same share of intermediates from abroad, the
increase in sales growth would substantially increase from 18.5% to 53.5%.
From this I conclude that if firms want to make use of operational hedges, they
seriously need to consider how exporting and importing regions jointly behave in
terms of exchange rate movements. As the analysis so far has shown, offshoring can
significantly reinforce the exchange rate effects of exporting if firms just follow the
average offshoring pattern in the industry. That average offshoring patterns typically
reinforce the exchange rate risks of exporting is easily reconcilable with optimizing
firm behavior if other criteria (such as lower prices) are relatively more important de-
terminants for the choice of sourcing regions. But given the anecdotal evidence cited
in the introduction, the potential for operational hedges might still play a role in the
choice of import regions, once other characteristics such as wages and institutional
factors have been accounted for. Section 6 addresses this question empirically.
5.3 Robustness
In table A.5 I address the robustness of the baseline and the fixed effects regression
from table 1. Specifications (1) in table A.5 repeats the baseline regression for better
comparability. In specification (2) I replace the projection coefficient with a dummy
variable equal to one if the projection coefficient is positive and thus above the sam-
ple mean. This turns the measure of co-movement into an ordinal variable which is
less dependent on the cardinal properties of the original proxy variable. The sim-
ple offshoring interaction now increases in size and becomes statistically significant,
confirming that the positive export effect is reinforced through offshoring if the co-
movement between export and import weighted exchange rates is below the average.
effects.
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Plotting the marginal effects (not shown) confirms that offshoring serves as a hedg-
ing device if the dummy is equal to one. An offshoring share of about 20% then
completely offsets the export related effects. In specification (3) I add an additional
interaction between the log change in the real effective exchange rates and a dummy
variable indicating whether a specific firm is using financial hedges. The result re-
main basically unchanged. Specification (4) uses the non-demeaned, raw projection
coefficients. Now again, the positive coefficient on the simple interaction between
exchange rates and offshoring becomes highly significant, indicating that for a pro-
jection coefficient of zero the effect of offshoring reinforces the effect of exporting
on exchange rate pass-through into sales growth. Note though that this time a zero
projection coefficient does not relate to the sample average but to zero co-movement
between export and the import weighted exchange rates. For the sector-level proxy
this never actually occurs in the sample. Taking the model seriously, the fact that
the effect is still positive again implies that the unobserved firm-level co-movement
is probably negative at this point. Specification (5) repeats the fixed effects specifica-
tion from table 1. Specifications (6) to (8) apply the same robustness tests to the fixed
effects specification that I applied to the baseline. Specifications (6) and (7) are fur-
ther robust to sector-country-year fixed effects when using 4-digit instead of 2-digit
industry codes. In specifications (9) and (10) I use nominal effective exchange rates
instead of real effective exchange rates. These are constructed as in equation (8) and
(9) but omit the CPI terms. Accordingly, specifications (9) and (10) correspond to a
test of the theoretical equation (6). The coefficients are robust to the change but are
slightly less significant in statistical terms. The results are also very similar in terms
of marginal effects. Specifically, using the projection coefficient of nominal exchange
rates at the 99th percentile and applying it to specification (9) implies that 9% off-
shoring is enough to balance out the effects of exporting. For real exchange rates, the
corresponding share of offshored intermediates was 7%.
5.4 Extension
One further way to test the robustness of my results is to see whether the framework
presented in section 3 is flexible enough to lend itself to other dependent variables. If
the empirical results really capture the theoretical channels suggested above, then this
should allow me to consider theoretically related effects and still find the empirical
results to be in line with the predictions. Specifically, if sales are affected by exchange
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rates through the exporting and importing channel in the way that the theoretical
structure suggests, than I should find analogous effects for material costs and profits.
Clearly, total material costs should be related to the costs of intermediates and and
the price of exports analogously to total sales. But if both sales and costs are affected
then also profits should depend on exchange rates via exports and imports.
Adjusting the theoretical framework in order to obtain estimable equations analo-
gous to equation (7) is straightforward, once I determine the theoretical counterparts
of total costs and total profits. Abstracting from fixed costs, which should not depend
to much on exchange rates, these are given as:45











πtot = rtot − ctot (13)
where qj and Qj resemble firm and total quantities sold in the corresponding coun-
try. As before, I take the partial derivative with respect to the real effective exchange
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where A ∈ [0, 1] and B ∈ [1, ∞]
The terms A and B are wedge factors indicating that, relative to total sales, the ex-
port related effects are smaller for total costs and larger for total profits. As shown
in the appendix, the export related effects are the same for all three measures, and
thus A = B = 1, if trade costs are zero (τ = 1). Intuitively, positive trade costs
create a wedge between foreign and domestic prices because exporters transfer the
production cost for units lost during transportation onto foreign consumers. Given
this wedge, a devaluation that increases foreign sales relative to domestic sales im-
45Details on the derivations and on the error terms are provided in section A.1.4 of the appendix.
30
plies that the average producer currency price charged by the affected firm is increas-
ing. This increase in prices adds to the increase in revenues but not to the increase
in quantities. Accordingly, the percentage increase in revenues is going to be higher
than the percentage increase in total costs. With revenues increasing more than costs
in percentage terms, the percentage increase in profits is going to be higher than the
increase in revenues and costs.46
In analogy to equation (7), equation (14) shows that the change in total costs can be
decomposed into a positive effect that results from the increase in quantities produced
for the export market and a negative effect mainly working through the reduction
in quantities produced due to higher costs and prices. Note that different from the
revenue case, the export related effect now only resembles the lower conversion of
domestic prices into foreign currency, as total material costs are already denominated
in domestic currency. On the other hand, the import related effect now explicitly
contains the higher conversion of imported input prices into domestic currency, given
quantities produced. The effect on operating profits resembles the net of the effects
on total revenues and total costs.
Table A.6 in the appendix shows the results from estimating equations (14) and
(15). Specification (1) repeats the baseline regression for material costs. The effects
are principally in line with the theoretical predictions though I fail to find a signifi-
cant effect for offshoring. Note however, that the absolute size of the coefficient on the
triple interaction is relatively close to the coefficients I obtained for total sales, which
is exactly what theory would predict. Furthermore, the coefficient on the export in-
teraction is smaller than in the sales regression, which is in line with the wedge factor
0 < A < 1. In specification (2) I replace the continuous projection coefficient by a
dummy variable indicating that the projection coefficient is above the sample mean.
Thus, specification (2) in table A.6 correspond to specification (2) in the robustness
table for total sales. Now the triple interaction becomes significant at the 5% level.
Again, note how close the estimate on the interaction is to the one obtained in table
A.5. Specification (3) and (4) repeat the exercise with the full set of fixed effects and
the more aggregate cluster level. Qualitatively, the results do not change significantly.
Specification (5) to (8) do the same regressions for total profits. Here I do not find
significant effects on the offshoring interactions. Yet, the export interaction is highly
significant and shows the expected sign. More importantly, the coefficient is larger
46Note that B is also decreasing in µ, because the function that relates the percentage change in πtot to
the percentage changes in rtot and ctot puts higher weight on rtot for higher markups.
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than both the coefficients for total sales and total material cost, providing further
evidence for the theoretical structure, as the predicted wedge factor B is larger than
1.47
Summing up, the regressions for total material costs in general confirm the findings
for total sales. The theoretical prediction of wedge factors A and B is confirmed by
the data, adding to the credibility of the theoretical framework. While I find highly
significant effects on the export interaction for total profits, the import interactions
are not significant. Note however that observed profits, to a much greater extent than
sales and material costs, contain many elements that are not contained in the theoret-
ical definition of profits. Most notably, the simple structure presented here does not
account for fixed costs and the costs of employees. Additionally, firms usually shift
profits strategically from one period to another in order to save on taxes. These omit-
ted factors imply that the empirical profit term is measuring the simple theoretical
equivalent with a lot of noise, probably much more than the other dependent vari-
ables. It is therefore not surprising that I find the estimates to be less precise in the
profit specification.
6 Regional Choice of Importing Regions
The results from section 5 suggest that operational hedging requires firms to delib-
erately take exchange rate characteristics into account when deciding on sourcing
regions. Specifically, in order to operate as a hedging device, offshoring needs to off-
set some of the exchange rate risk that is due to other international activities. As the
previous analysis has shown, for exporters this requires the co-movement between
export and intermediate import weighted exchange rates to be sufficiently high. Yet,
to my knowledge, no empirical study to date has taken the co-movement of exchange
rates into account in explaining exporters’ choice of sourcing regions. In this section,
I will therefore provide first empirical evidence relating firms’ sourcing decisions to
the co-movement of exchange rates.
I am going to capture sourcing decisions with a dummy variable indicating whether
a firm was sourcing from a specific area in 2008. As noted earlier, EFIGE provides in-
47Note that taking the coefficients from the export interactions seriously actually allows me to deter-
mine the average trade costs and markups implied by the structural model. Using the estimates
from the baseline regressions implies wedge factors A = 0.85 and B = 1.55. Evaluating the theo-
retical terms of factors A and B at the average export share in the sample (19%) implies trade costs
of τ = 1.22 and a markup of µ = 1.23.
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formation on the regional distribution of international firm activities as of 2008, where
the world is split into eight distinct areas. For each of these areas, respondents where
asked to indicate whether raw material or intermediate goods were purchased from
or whether products were sold to that specific area. I use this information in order
to expand my data along the geographic dimension. Again, I match the data with
monthly real effective exchange rates. These are now constructed as a trade weighted
average of all available exchange rates within a certain EFIGE area.48
I use the monthly data to construct time invariant measures of exchange rate volatil-
ity and the projection coefficient, using the full range of years in my data. Specifically,
I determine the standard deviation of all measures of the effective exchange rate as
well as the covariance between the intermediate import and the export weighted ef-
fective exchange rates, both in logs and in levels. Note that from these I can easily
recover the regional projection coefficients defined in equation (10). I then drop the
time dimension for the empirical analysis. Because EFIGE provides information on
regional exports and imports for 2008 only, I am not able to make use of the time-
dimension when analyzing the sourcing decision of firms. Thus, regression and iden-
tification in this section will be based on a firm-area panel, where one observation
represents firm activity in a specific area of the world.
On this data, I run the following regression:

















where importercsiκ is a dummy variable indicating whether firm i, active in country
c and sector s, was importing intermediates from area κ in 2008 and exportercsiκ is
48I use the same method as detailed in equations (8) and (9), only that this time region κ corresponds
to a specific EFIGE area rather than the world as a whole. I will also construct a third real ef-
fective exchange rate that represents total trade, and thus both intermediate imports and exports.
It is going to provide a measure of the overall regional volatility. I am using the overall trade
weighted volatility rather than the export or intermediate import weighted volatility because those
two measures are highly correlated and a separate identification of effects related to one or the
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the corresponding dummy for exports. sd(Rxicsκt)csκ is the standard deviation over all
months in the sample period of the home country c specific trade weighted real ef-
fective exchange rate in region κ. P̂roj
didx
csκ is the area κ specific elasticity of the import
weighted with respect to the export weighted real effective exchange rate. Addition-
ally, I am going to add all relevant sub-interaction terms as well as a number of control
variables and fixed effects to the model. Because standard errors are potentially clus-
tered across areas for a given firm and because all firms in a given country-sector-area
combination obtain the same measures of exchange rate volatility and co-movement,
I allow for two-way clustering at the firm and the country-sector-area level.
My expectations with respect to the sign of the coefficients in equation (17) are ex-
plained in what follows. I expect the probability of firm i sourcing intermediates from
region k to be higher if the firm is exporting to that very same region. The reason is
that entering a new geographic region usually implies fixed costs, such as finding a
translator, establishing business networks or getting to know the legal system. As a
firm that already exports to a region will probably be able to save on some of these
expenses, I expect δ1 to be positive.
49 I expect δ2 to be negative if the key assumption
of this paper, that firms dislike exchange rate risk, holds in the data.50 If firms are con-
sidering hedging activities because they want profits and sales to be less responsive
to exchange rate shocks, then, ceteris paribus, they should be less inclined to source
from highly volatile regions. This is true even if a firm is exporting to that region
because, as has been shown in the previous sections, offshoring might actually add to
the exchange rate risk of exporting for the average firm. Only if importing helps the
firm to offset some of the exchange rate shocks to the export value, I would expect the
probability of offshoring to be rising in exchange rate volatility for exporting firms.
This is the case when the shock to the export weighted exchange rate translates into
49The reason for taking export status into the model in the first place, is that offshoring decisions are
only related to operational hedging activities for firms that are actually exposed to exchange rate
risks. The export status is clearly a good indicator for that.
50A large literature has shown that firms’ international activities are related to the volatility of ex-
change rates. Thus, Cheung and Sengupta (2013) and Héricourt and Poncet (2015) show that firm-
level exports to a specific destination are decreasing in the volatility of bilateral exchange rates.
Earlier aggregate and sector-level evidence on the effects of exchange rate volatility on exports is
surveyed in McKenzie (1999). Literature focusing on volatility and FDI flows is reviewed in Bloni-
gen (2005). Note that in a recent paper Héricourt and Nedoncelle (2016) regress regional export
performance on volatility measures and explicitly control for operational hedging by adding a re-
gional import dummy interaction. They find imports to diminish the negative effect of exchange
rate volatility on exports. While their approach is closely related to the one presented here, they
focus on the intensive margin of exports rather than the extensive margin of intermediate imports.
They also treat the importer status merely as a control variable and do not further discuss the im-
plications of their results with respect to operational hedging.
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a corresponding movement in the import weighted exchange rate. Theoretically, the
degree to which the import weighted exchange rate responds to the export weighted
exchange rate is given by the elasticity of the import weighted with respect to the
export weighed exchange rate. Empirically, this elasticity is approximated by Projdidxcsκ
and accordingly I expect δ3 to be positive.
Table 2 presents the results from estimating a linear probability model of equation
(17). Note that all specifications include at least area and firm fixed effects, which
control for the average level of sourcing in certain areas, industries or for specific
firms. Other than that, specification (1) only contains the explanatory variables de-
tailed in equation (17) and the relevant sub-interaction terms. As expected, the prob-
ability of firm i sourcing from area κ is on average higher for firms that exported to
the given area in 2008. But note that the regional exporter status is becoming, ceteris
paribus, a worse predictor of offshoring when the sourcing region is highly volatile
in terms of the real effective exchange rate. As noted earlier, the reason for that is
that the import weighted exchange rate is not trailing the export weighted exchange
rate close enough for the average firm, even within specific areas. Abstracting from
other reasons of offshoring, foreign sourcing then simply adds to the already higher
exchange rate risks of exporters. Thus, while the model predicts the probability of
regional offshoring to be 15.9 percentage points higher for regional exporters than
for non-exporters when abstracting from exchange rate volatility, the exporter effect
is reduced to 4.3 percentage points when factoring in the average level of exchange
rate volatility. As the highly significant coefficient on the triple interaction indicates,
the effect of volatility on the sourcing decision of exporters significantly changes with
the elasticity of the import weighted with respect to the export weighted real effective
exchange rate. Thus, evaluating at the 10th percentile of the elasticity distribution, ex-
porting increases the probability of regional sourcing by merely 2 percentage points,
whereas the effect is 7 percentage points for an elasticity at the 90th percentile.
The contrast becomes more pronounced when considering regions with above av-
erage volatility. Thus, setting the volatility to the 75th percentile of the distribution
implies that the probability of regional sourcing actually decreases by 3.5 percentage
points for a regional exporter that faces a low co-movement of exchange rates, while
it increases by 4.2 percentage points for exporters facing a high co-movement.
The fact that the probability of importing responds not only to area characteris-
tics, exporter status and the level of exchange rate volatility, but crucially depends on
the co-movement between intermediate import and export weighted exchange rates
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Table 2: Area Baseline
importercsiκ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
exportercsiκ 0.159*** 0.153*** 0.147*** 0.180*** 0.0691*** 0.0570*** 0.0755*** 0.0528***
(0.0132) (0.0139) (0.0173) (0.0157) (0.0147) (0.0182) (0.0168) (0.0172)
exportercsiκ × sd(R
xi
csκt)csκ -1.147*** -1.124*** -1.084*** -1.249*** -0.939*** -0.880*** -0.890*** -0.655***





csκ 1.927*** 2.376*** 1.934*** 1.786*** 1.979*** 2.046*** 1.886*** 3.014***
(0.434) (0.455) (0.434) (0.434) (0.459) (0.457) (0.414) (0.588)
exportercsiκ × P̂roj
didx
csκ -0.0629 -0.108* -0.0700 -0.0300 -0.0349 -0.0458 -0.0630 -0.0710
(0.0616) (0.0641) (0.0616) (0.0633) (0.0619) (0.0632) (0.0587) (0.0687)
sd(Rxicsκt)csκ × P̂roj
didx
csκ 0.161 0.131 0.172 0.177 0.299 0.275
(0.242) (0.249) (0.242) (0.243) (0.271) (0.244)
sd(Rxicsκt)csκ -0.0959 -0.135 -0.121 -0.0855 -0.146 -0.236*
(0.128) (0.122) (0.129) (0.128) (0.137) (0.122)
P̂roj
didx
csκ 0.0453 0.0485 0.0455 0.0403 0.0237 0.0218
(0.0397) (0.0441) (0.0398) (0.0399) (0.0434) (0.0427)
reg. io-import sharecsκ 0.515*** 0.501***
(0.0743) (0.0732)
reg. f inal-export sharecsκ 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.0747* 0.0634
(0.0409) (0.0408) (0.0387) (0.0402)
exportercsiκ × rel. io-wage (p.C.)csκ 0.00966 0.0410*** 0.0455*** 0.0718***
(0.00898) (0.0109) (0.0113) (0.0149)
rel. io-wage (p.C.)csκ 0.00211 0.00474
(0.00561) (0.00618)
exportercsiκ × rel. io-lab.prod.csκ -0.0111*** -0.0214*** -0.0233*** -0.0208***
(0.00331) (0.00597) (0.00646) (0.00594)
rel. io-lab.prod.csκ 0.000529 0.00258
(0.00193) (0.00257)
exportercsiκ × Grubel-Lloydcsκ 0.129*** 0.121*** 0.0811*** 0.0477***
(0.0147) (0.0150) (0.0133) (0.0137)
Grubel-Lloydcsκ -0.0122** -0.0180*** -0.0174*** -0.0203**
(0.00613) (0.00582) (0.00632) (0.00793)
Fixed Effects γκ + γi γκ + γi γκ + γi γκ + γi γκ + γi γκ + γi γcsκ + γi γcsκ + γi
Area κ κ κ κ κ κ κ κ̂
Cluster (Firm) 12311 11229 12311 12311 11474 11228 11225 11080
Cluster (Sector#Country#Area) 1450 1026 1450 1450 1039 1026 1008 756
Adj. R2 0.303 0.313 0.304 0.304 0.307 0.315 0.335 0.363
Observations 95,490 86,988 95,490 95,490 88,567 86,952 86,934 65,003
Notes: Observations relate to firm i in area κ, where firms are based in country c and active in sector s. The dependent variable importercsiκ
is an indicator equal to one if the firm is sourcing intermediates from region κ. exportercsiκ is an indicator equal to one if the firm is exporting
to region κ. sd(Rxicsκt)csκ is the standard deviation of the monthly export and import weighted, area κ specific real effective exchange rate,
measured over the full sample period. P̂roj
didx
csκ is the demeaned elasticity of the import weighted with respect to the export weighted area κ
specific real effective exchange rate. reg. io-import sharecsκ is share of intermediate imports from area κ in all intermediate imports (2-digit).
reg. f inal-export sharecsκ is the share of final good exports to area κ in all final good exports (4-digit). rel. io-wage (p.C.)csκ is the wage per
employee in intermediate input industries in area κ relative to country c (2-digit). rel. io-lab.prod.csκ is the value added per employee in
intermediate input industries in area κ relative to country c (2-digit). Grubel-Lloydcsκ is the Grubel-Lloyed Index of industry s for trade with
area κ (4-digit). γκ are area fixed effects, γi are firm fixed effects and γcsκ are country-sector-area fixed effects. The sector level is defined at
the 2-digit US SIC level. Specification (7) regroups small areas into larger areas. Specifically, Central & South America are grouped together
with USA & Canada, and China & India are grouped together with Other Countries. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and at
the sector-country-area level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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is what I count as evidence for operational hedging. Note that the coefficient on the
triple interaction can be read in two ways. On the one hand, it implies that for a given
level of exchange rate volatility, the probability of regional sourcing for an exporter
relative to a non-exporter is increasing in the co-movement of exchange rates. This
is in line with operational hedging, because the co-movement of exchange rates im-
plies that a shock to the export weighted exchange rate is offset partly by a change in
marginal cost, keeping profits and sales of the exporter relatively stable. On the other
hand, the triple interaction implies that exporters will attribute more importance to a
given level of exchange-rate co-movement when the volatility of the potential sourc-
ing region increases. Because then shocks to the value of exports due to exchange
rate movements are relatively severe, exporting firms should have a higher interest
in considering offsetting effects through adjustments in the marginal cost, i.e. opera-
tional hedging.
In specifications (2) to (6) I add various controls at the sectoral level that are poten-
tially correlated with the sectoral exchange rate measures and are known to have an
impact on the sourcing decision of firms. In specification (2) I add area κ’s share in
total intermediate imports of country c to the model, as well as the regional share in
final good exports from country c. Both measures are country, industry and area spe-
cific and are indicative of the differential importance of area κ for sector-level trade.
Not surprisingly, the estimates suggest that firms tend to source more frequently from
areas that provide inputs to other firms in the sector. Furthermore, the probability of
sourcing from a given region is increasing in the sectoral importance of that region as
an export market. This is in line with an access cost story at the sectoral level. Con-
trolling for the differential importance of region κ at the sectoral level does not alter
the main results significantly, though the effect on the triple interaction increases in
terms of absolute size.
While specification (2) controls for the overall importance of the different areas in
terms of trade, specifications (3) to (6) consider specific industry characteristics of
those regions. Specification (3) looks at the per-capita wage in region κ for all input
industries of sector s and relates it to the corresponding wage in firm i’s home country
c. Note that I add the relative wage in levels and further allow it to interact with the
exporter dummy. While the reason to enter the level control is quite obvious, the
reason to add the interacted control is of a more technical nature: as the effects under
examination happen at the interaction level, controls, supposed to disentangle the
exchange rate effects from alternative channels, should also enter at the interaction
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level.51 From table 2 it can be seen that the relative wage control is not affecting my
estimates significantly. The coefficients on the controls are statistically close to zero,
which is somewhat surprising, given that offshoring is often attributed to low foreign
wages. Note however that the specification already controls for area fixed effects and
that the relative wage control therefore measures wage effects only as long as they
deviate at the sectoral level from the area average.
Specification (4) controls for the relative labor productivity in region κ’s input in-
dustries. Again the level control is insignificant but now the effect is significant at
the interaction level. Nevertheless, all interactions of interest remain significant at
the 1% level. In specification (5) I add the Grubel-Lloyd index as a measure of intra-
industry trade. This is supposed to control for the type of final good trade between
area κ and home country c in firm i’s output industry. A rise in the measure implies
that comparative advantages are becoming less important in shaping trade patterns.
The fact that the level effect on the control is negative is in line with offshoring being
less relevant for regions that are similar to country c in terms of the trade structure.
Not surprisingly, the control seems to be important for the correlation between export
and import status and therefore reduces the exporter dummy effect substantially. In
specification (6) I add all sector-level controls at the same time but the results remain
stable.
In specification (7), I replace area dummies by country-sector-area fixed effects.
Accordingly, all level effects relating to the exchange rate measures and some of the
controls are dropped from the model.52 Specification (7) is my preferred specifica-
tion. Astonishingly, the marginal effects implied by specification (7) are very close
to the effects discussed earlier. Thus, for a high volatility region (75th percentile of
the distribution), specification (7) implies that exporting decreases the probability of
regional sourcing by 3.4 percentage points if the projection coefficient is at the 10th
percentile but increases the probability by 4.2 percentage points for a projection coef-
ficient at the 90th percentile of the distribution. The earlier results were -3.5 and 4.2
51For the controls of specification (2), the inclusion of an interaction term yields insignificant results
for the main effects under consideration. This is not surprising, given that the sectoral controls of
specification (2) capture the full industry sourcing patterns and thus will also contain the average
effects of operational hedging at the sectoral level. The remaining variation of the sectoral exchange
rate measure is then simply not enough to identify additional firm specific effects. Different from
the controls in specification (2), the controls in specifications (3) to (6) are focused exclusively on
alternative channels, leaving the full variation related to exchange rates for identification.
52Note that controls determined at the final good industry level remain in the model because they are
constructed at the 4-digit industry level, whereas sectoral dummies relate to the 2-digit level. See
the variable description in the appendix for details.
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respectively.
Specification (8) repeats specification (7), but is based on a different area grouping.
Specifically, I group the smallest regions together, i.e. Central & South America to-
gether with USA & Canada and China & India together with Other Countries. As
shown in table A.1 in the appendix, exchange rate data is available for a limited set
of countries only. Matching the different data sets implies an additional loss of coun-
tries, such that in my data Central & South America consists of Brazil and Mexico
only. Furthermore, the complete set of Other Areas is represented by South Africa
alone. Naturally, if the number of countries in a given region becomes too small, the
co-movement of exchange rates increases. Thus effectively, the correlation coefficient
is equal to one for Other Areas and potentially gets close to one if the number of
countries per area is small.53 This effect was of no consequence in the first part of
the paper, as all effective exchange rates were constructed over the same set of avail-
able countries. For the current specification, the number of countries that feed into
the area-specific effective exchange rates is different across areas. Note though, that
this is partly controlled for by area or country-sector-area fixed effects. Still, because
I am identifying at the interaction level, some of the constructional bias in projection
coefficients might still be present in my results. Regrouping countries into broader
areas increases the minimum number of countries in a given area to four.54 As shown
in table 2, the results remain qualitatively the same for the new grouping. Quantita-
tively, the effects are slightly smaller, with the probability of regional imports from a
high volatility region increasing in exporter status by 3.5 percentage points for a high
projection coefficient but virtually independent of exporting for firms facing a low
projection coefficient. Note though, that by reducing the number of areas from 8 to 6,
a quarter of the observations yields no additional information and accordingly is lost
for the empirical analysis. Because my focus lies on the qualitative results, I will stick
to the full data set in what follows.
In table A.7 I present further robustness results, built upon specification (7) from
the baseline table. Specification (1) to (5) consider real exchange rates and specifica-
tion (6) to (10) nominal exchange rates. I will mention differences between the real
and the nominal exchange rate specifications only if relevant. Specifications (1) and
53See table A.4 in the appendix.
54Except for EU15 (14) and Other Asian (8), the groups are now relatively homogenous in size, with
four or five countries in each regional cluster. In the robustness section I will re-run the regression
omitting the two larger areas and show that my results do not exclusively hinge on these two
country clusters.
39
(6) repeat the baseline. Note that my baseline results are robust to using the nom-
inal instead of the real exchange rate. The marginal effects are slightly larger, with
the probability of regional sourcing 5 percentage points higher for a firm with pro-
jection coefficient at the 90th percentile and 4.3 percentage points lower for a firm
at the 10th percentile (evaluated for regions with exchange rate volatility at the 75th
percentile). In specifications (2) and (7), I use the non-demeaned projection coeffi-
cient which delivers identical results for the triple interaction. Specifications (3) and
(8) use an indicator equal to one if the demeaned projection coefficient is larger than
zero. The results remain qualitatively the same. The marginal effects implied are +3.6
and -1.6 percentage points for the real exchange rate (+4.3 and +1.6 for the nominal
exchange rate) where these now refer to a firm with above and below average pro-
jection coefficient. Specification (4) and (9) use the demeaned correlation coefficient
rather than the projection coefficient. This renders the coefficient on the triple inter-
action negative and insignificant. While this might be due to high collinearity of the
triple interaction term,55 I would argue that to some extent it also reflects the limited
information content of the correlation coefficient. While the projection coefficient con-
tains information regarding the actual size of the response in the intermediate import
weighted exchange rate to a change in the export weighted exchange rate, the corre-
lation just measures their linear association. Because hedging requires the response
in the costs of intermediates to be sizable, the projection coefficient is the preferable
measure.
Specification (5) and (10) finally omit EU15 and Other Asian Countries from the
set of regions. As discussed earlier, these areas are especially large in terms of the
number of distinct countries involved and thus the projection coefficient might be
biased due to constructional reasons. Furthermore, EU15 is by far the most important
area in terms of export and import activity (see table A.4), with about 48% of the
firms exporting to and 35% of the firms sourcing from EU15. Additionally, note that
12 out of 15 countries in EU15 use the Euro as currency. For many of the firms in
my data, the exchange rate risk for the EU15 activities is therefore relatively small
and relates to changes in the relative price levels. Accordingly, it is important to
check whether my results hinge on the EU15 alone. As shown in specification (5) and
(10), the effect on the triple interaction turns insignificant after dropping EU15 and
Other Asian Countries for real exchange rates but remains significant close to the 5%
55The variance inflation factor (VIF) of the triple interaction, for real exchange rates, is 16.9 for the
correlation coefficient - up from 5.5 for the projection coefficient.
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level for the nominal exchange rate (p-value = 0.051).56 The marginal effects for the
high and low projection coefficient implied by these estimates are +4.5 and -0.093%
respectively.
7 Conclusion
This paper confirms earlier results, suggesting that imported intermediates are im-
portant determinants for the pass-through of exchange rates into prices and sales of
an exporter. If marginal costs and export prices are denominated in currencies that
are closely related, then shocks to the exchange rate will trigger offsetting effects on
foreign demand. Specifically, a devaluation will lower foreign prices through a con-
version effect and increase foreign prices due to higher marginal costs. The reverse
effects hold for an appreciation. This is an important finding, given that the appar-
ent disconnect between exchange rates and trade flows has been considered one of
the major puzzles in macroeconomics. Yet, the shift of focus away from the macroe-
conomic country perspective towards decisions taken at the firm level has brought
to light a second question: do internationally active firms synchronize international
activities and purposely produce a disconnect between exchange rates and prices in
order to reduce their exposure to exchange rates?
The findings presented in this paper shed new light on this question that has only
been addressed for large multinationals in the previous literature. They suggest that
a qualified yes might be the answer. Offshoring provides for a means to operational
hedging if and only if sourcing regions are closely related to the firm’s export market
in terms of exchange rate co-movement. Note that the conditionality of the statement
as well as the focus on small and medium-sized firms are two sides of a medal. Large
multinationals are active in many countries and many dimensions, whereas the di-
versity of international activities decreases rapidly when considering smaller firms.
Thus, while the diversification effect might provide a natural hedge for large multi-
nationals, as earlier studies have confirmed, my findings suggest that smaller firms
will have to actively match international activities in order to benefit from operational
hedges.
Viewed from a different perspective, my results send a clear warning to small and
medium-sized firms considering a mix of different international activities: because
export and sourcing decisions are often taken for reasons other than exchange rate
56The p-value is 0.029 when only omitting the EU15 and keeping Other Asian Countries in the model.
41
considerations, such as cheap foreign inputs or promising foreign markets, firms are
potentially underestimating the exchange rate risks involved. The tempting idea of
natural hedges just doesn’t appear to hold for the average firm.
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Where in case of a devaluation total revenues change due to:
• the change in domestic revenues
a) higher prices due to higher import cost (given quantities)
b) lower demand due to higher prices
ǫ1) sectoral effect that resembles general equilibrium adjustments in the do-
mestic demand shifter
• and the change in foreign revenues
c) higher conversion of foreign revenues into domestic currency (given rev-
enues in foreign currency)
d) change in foreign prices due to d1) higher import cost and d2) lower con-
version of domestic prices into foreign currency (given quantities)
e) change in foreign demand due to the price changes induced by e1) higher
import cost and e2) lower conversion of domestic prices into foreign cur-
rency (given quantities)
ǫ2) sectoral effect that resembles general equilibrium adjustments in the for-
eign demand shifter
Using Dixit-Stiglitz definitions of prices, quantities and the price elasticity of de-
mand, as well as my definitions of marginal cost and the share imported intermedi-
ates (IS), reordering, multiplying with the absolute change in Ex and keeping track of

































The effects are now ordered in the following way:57
• A positive effect on foreign revenues due to a higher conversion of foreign rev-
enues into domestic currency (c)
• A positive effect on foreign revenues due to a lower conversion of domestic
prices into foreign currency (d2 + e2)
• A negative effect on domestic revenues due to higher material cost (a + b),
• A negative effect on foreign revenues due to higher material cost (d1 + e1)
• Sectoral effects that resemble general equilibrium adjustments in the domestic
and foreign demand shifter, weighted by firm activity at home and abroad (ǫ1 +
ǫ2)
A.1.2 The Structural Error for Nominal Exchange Rates















A.1.3 The Structural Error for Real Exchange Rates















+σ · 1 · XS ·
∆P̂
P̂
− (σ − 1) · IS ·
∆P̂
P̂
where P̂ ≡ P€/P$ resembles the relative price levels abroad and at home.
57Note that the quantity effect always dominates the price effect for σ > 1
49













B: change in marginal cost






















































a1) decreases domestic demand due to higher domestic prices (higher input costs)
a2) decreases foreign demand due to higher foreign prices (higher input costs)
a3) increases foreign demand due to lower conversion of domestic prices into for-
eign prices
B) increases total cost due to higher conversion of imported input prices into do-
mestic currency (given quantities)
ǫ′c) Sectoral effects that resemble general equilibrium adjustments in the domestic
and foreign demand shifter, weighted by firm activity at home and abroad
Multiplying with the absolute change in exchange rates, using Dixit-Stiglitz defini-
tions of prices, quantities and the price elasticity of demand, as well as my definitions
of marginal cost and the share imported intermediates (IS), reordering and keeping
































Profits The equivalent of equation (15) in nominal terms results by using equations

















































Exc$ = [(1 − i)w€ + iw$Ei] · q$ = Exr$ ·
1
µτ





































= XS · A
where: A → 1 if τ → 1 and A → 0 if τ → ∞







































Exc$ = Exr$ ·
1
µτ






































= XS · B








> 1 if τ → ∞
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The Structural Error for Real Exchange Rates - Costs















+σ · A · XS ·
∆P̂
P̂
− (σ − 1) · IS ·
∆P̂
P̂
The Structural Error for Real Exchange Rates - Profits















+σ · B · XS ·
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Table A.1: The Currency Basket
EFIGE Area Partner Country Currency
EU15 Austria Euro
EU15 Belgium Euro











EU15 Sweden Swedish krona
EU15 United Kingdom Pound sterling
OTHER EU COUNTRIES Bulgaria Bulgarian lev
OTHER EU COUNTRIES Czech Republic Czech koruna
OTHER EU COUNTRIES Hungary Hungarian forint
OTHER EU COUNTRIES Poland Polish zloty
OTHER EU COUNTRIES Romania Romanian leu
OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES NOT EU Croatia Croatian kuna
OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES NOT EU Norway Norwegian krone
OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES NOT EU Russian Federation Russian rouble
OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES NOT EU Switzerland Swiss franc
OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES NOT EU Turkey Turkish lira
CHINA AND INDIA China Renminbi-yuan
CHINA AND INDIA Hong Kong, China Hong Kong dollar
CHINA AND INDIA India Indian rupee
OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES Indonesia Indonesian rupiah
OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES Israel Israeli shekel
OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES Japan Japanese yen
OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES Korea, Rep. South Korean won
OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES Malaysia Malaysian ringgit
OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES Philippines Philippine peso
OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES Singapore Singapore dollar
OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES Thailand Thai baht
USA AND CANADA Canada Canadian dollar
USA AND CANADA United States US dollar
CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA Brazil Brazilian real
CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA Mexico Mexican peso
OTHER AREAS South Africa South African rand
dropped due to missing price data Australia Australian dollar
dropped due to missing price data New Zealand New Zealand dollar
dropped due to missing price data Serbia Serbian dinar
dropped due to missing price data Argentina Argentine peso
dropped due to missing trade data Iceland Icelandic krona
dropped due to missing trade data Macedonia Denar (of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)
dropped due to missing trade data Taiwan New Taiwan dollar
Notes: I use bilateral nominal exchange rates with respect to the Euro from Eurostat [ert_bil_eur_m]. These are matched
with seasonally adjusted CPI price data from World Bank’s Global Economic Monitor [CPTOTSAXN] in order to construct
real exchange rates with respect to the Euro, the Pound Sterling and the Hungarian Forint. Eurostat provides bilateral
exchange rates with respect to the EURO for 36 currencies. I can match 32 of these currencies with the CPI data, loosing
the Australian Dollar, the New Zealand Dollar, the Serbian Dinar and the Argentine Peso due to missing price data for the
base month January 2004. Matching the combined exchange rate and price data with trade data leads to the loss of three
additional currencies, the Icelandic Krona, the Macedonian Denar and the New Taiwan Dollar. The reason is that I want
to keep the set of countries feeding into the weighting of exchange rates to be relatively constant across all industries and
I want them to be the same for both export and import flows. As trade flows are a crucial determinant in the effective
exchange rate construction, they also determine the co-movement of effective exchange rates. I therefore need to make sure
that it is not missing data that is driving my results. Thus, I drop industries when too many countries are missing for those
industries and I drop countries with two many missing industries. This results in a set of 29 currencies other than the Euro,
plus 12 distinct real Euro exchange rates.
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Table A.2: Description of Variables
variable description
XScsi Percentage of annual turnover represented by exports (2008, EFIGE).
IScsi Percentage of intermediate goods purchased from abroad (2008, EFIGE).
importercsiκ Indicator equal to 1 if percentage of intermediate goods purchased from area κ larger
than zero (2008, EFIGE).
exportercsiκ Indicator equal to 1 if percentage of exports sold to area κ larger than zero (2008,
EFIGE).
FHcsi Indicator equal to 1 if firm uses foreign exchange risk protection (2008, EFIGE).
Salescsit turnover in th. EUR (Amadeus), if missing: costs of goods sold - costs of employees in
th. EUR (Amadeus).
Materialcostcsit material cost in th. EUR (Amadeus)
Pro f itscsit gross profit in th. EUR (Amadeus), if missing: turnover - costs of goods sold in th. EUR
(Amadeus).
Assetscsit total assets in th. EUR (Amadeus).
µcsit turnover / (cost of employees + material cost) in th. EUR (Amadeus). Alternative
measures used: (turnover - cost of employees - material cost) /turnover in th. EUR
(Amadeus) , EMS2008csκ : XScsκ ∗ Sales
2008
csκ / (total sectoral imports of the outside world
(WITS/Comtrade), see Marin et al. (2014) for detailed information).
R
f
csκt with f ∈ x, i, xi Export weighted (x), intermediate input weighted (i) or export and import weighted
(xi) real effective exchange rate specific to country c, sector s and area κ. If the κ is




csκt with f ∈ x, i, xi Export weighted (x), intermediate input weighted (i) or export and import weighted
(xi) nominal effective exchange rate specific to country c, sector s and area κ. If the κ is
omitted, the weighting is done with respect to the whole world. See section 4 for
detailed information.
Projdidxcsκ Elasticity of the monthly intermediate import weighted with respect to the export
weighted exchange rate, measured over the full sample period. Real or nominal in
accordance with the exchange rate measure used and specific to country c, sector s
and area κ. If the κ is omitted, the weighting is done with respect to the whole world.
P̂roj
didx
csκ is the corresponding measure demeaned for the sample. See section 4 for
detailed information.
ĉorrcsκ Simple correlation coefficient between the monthly intermediate import weighted and
the export weighted exchange rate, demeaned for the regression sample and
measured over the full sample period. Real or nominal in accordance with the
exchange rate measure used and specific to country c, sector s and area κ.
sd(Rxicsκt)csκ Standard deviation of the monthly intermediate import and export weighted real
effective exchange rate specific to country c, sector s and area κ and measured over
the full sample period.
sd(Exicsκt)csκ Standard deviation of the monthly intermediate import and export weighted nominal
effective exchange rate specific to country c, sector s and area κ and measured over
the full sample period.
reg. io-import sharecsκ Share of region κ in all industry s intermediate imports into country c. Import data at
the 2-digit level (ISIC Rev. 3) from WITS/Comtrade, linked to output industries via the
IO-table from OECD Stan.
reg. f inal-export sharecsκ Share of region κ in all industry s final good exports from country c. Export data at the
4-digit level (ISIC Rev. 3) from WITS/Comtrade.
rel. io-wage (p.C.)csκ Wage per Employee (INDSTAT, ISIC Rev. 3, 2-digit) in region κ relative to Wage per
Employee in country c. Relative wage is input-industry specific, where input
industries have been linked to output industries via the IO-table from OECD Stan.
rel. io-lab.prod.csκ Value Added per Employee (INDSTAT, ISIC Rev. 3, 2-digit) in region κ relative to
Value Added per Employee in country c. Relative labor productivity is input-industry





, where EXcsκ are final good export flows from country c to area κ in
industry s (WITS/Comtrade) at the 4-digit level (ISIC Rev. 3) and IMcsκ are
corresponding final good import flows from region κ into country c.
Table A.3: Summary Statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Summary Statistics for Section 5
∆log(Salescsit) 60174 0.00 0.22 -0.75 0.66
∆log(Materialcostscsit) 60174 0.00 0.34 -1.15 1.04
∆log(Pro f itscsit) 60174 -0.01 0.38 -1.51 1.20
real
∆logRxcst 60174 0.00 0.02 -0.10 0.14
P̂roj
didx
cs 60174 0.00 0.16 -0.51 0.67
P̂roj
didx
cs > 0 60174 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00
Projdidxcs 60174 0.86 0.16 0.35 1.53
nominal
∆logExcst 60174 0.00 0.02 -0.06 0.14
P̂roj
didx
cs 60174 0.00 0.14 -0.37 0.61
P̂roj
didx
cs > 0 60174 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00
Projdidxcs 60174 0.65 0.14 0.28 1.25
IScsi 60174 0.13 0.23 0.00 1.00
XScsi 60174 0.19 0.27 0.00 1.00
µcsit 60174 1.53 0.38 1.00 3.55
∆log(Assetscsit) 60174 0.03 0.18 -0.51 0.61
FHcsi 60174 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Summary Statistics for Section 6
importercsiκ 86934 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
exportercsiκ 86934 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
real
sd(Xxicsκt)csκ 86934 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.35
P̂roj
didx
csκ 86934 0.00 0.16 -0.82 0.79
Projdidxcsκ 86934 0.98 0.16 0.16 1.77
P̂roj
didx
csκ > 0 86934 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00
ĉorrcsκ 86934 0.00 0.08 -0.86 0.05
nominal
sd(Xxicsκt)csκ 86934 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.25
P̂roj
didx
csκ 86934 0.00 0.20 -1.18 0.87
Projdidxcsκ 86934 0.93 0.20 -0.25 1.81
P̂roj
didx
csκ > 0 86934 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00
ĉorrcsκ 86934 0.00 0.16 -1.08 0.11
reg. io-import sharecsκ 86934 0.12 0.20 0.00 0.75
reg. f inal-export sharecsκ 86934 0.13 0.19 0.00 0.94
rel. io-wage (p.C.)csκ 86934 0.59 0.56 0.04 5.86
rel. io-lab.prod.csκ 86934 0.88 0.95 0.12 12.54
Grubel-Lloydcsκ 86934 0.52 0.29 0.00 1.00
Notes: Table provides selected summary statistics for the vari-
ables used in sections 5 and 6. For a definition of variables, see ta-
ble A.2. ∆log(Salescsit), ∆log(Materialcostscsit), ∆log(Pro f itscsit),
∆log(Assetscsit) and µcsit are winsorized at the 1%-level in order to
normalize the error distribution. The results presented are robust
to using the non-winsorized variables.
Table A.4: Summary Statistics - Key Variables (by Area)
Area #c Obs Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
importercsiκ exportercsiκ
EU15 14 11078 0.35 0.48 0.48 0.50
OTHER EU COUNTRIES 5 10799 0.09 0.29 0.23 0.42
OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES NOT EU 5 10913 0.07 0.26 0.25 0.43
CHINA AND INDIA 3 10755 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.33
OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES 8 10789 0.05 0.22 0.14 0.35
USA AND CANADA 2 10812 0.07 0.25 0.19 0.39
CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA 2 10927 0.02 0.13 0.12 0.32
OTHER AREAS 1 10861 0.02 0.14 0.15 0.36
CHINA, INDIA + OTHER 4 10755 0.12 0.32 0.21 0.41
AMERICA 4 10812 0.08 0.27 0.22 0.42
Area #c Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
sd(Rxicsκt)csκ
EU15 14 11078 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.09
OTHER EU COUNTRIES 5 10799 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.14
OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES NOT EU 5 10913 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.14
CHINA AND INDIA 3 10755 0.13 0.02 0.11 0.18
OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES 8 10789 0.09 0.02 0.07 0.15
USA AND CANADA 2 10812 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.10
CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA 2 10927 0.13 0.03 0.06 0.23
OTHER AREAS 1 10861 0.12 0.00 0.12 0.13
CHINA, INDIA + OTHER 4 10755 0.12 0.02 0.09 0.17
AMERICA 4 10812 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.12




EU15 14 11078 -0.13 0.11 -0.49 0.12 0.96
OTHER EU COUNTRIES 5 10799 0.00 0.04 -0.23 0.08 0.98
OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES NOT EU 5 10913 -0.14 0.06 -0.36 0.04 0.93
CHINA AND INDIA 3 10755 0.19 0.07 -0.06 0.45 0.96
OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES 8 10789 -0.12 0.10 -0.34 0.12 0.86
USA AND CANADA 2 10812 0.01 0.02 -0.09 0.07 0.99
CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA 2 10927 0.17 0.23 -0.82 0.79 0.86
OTHER AREAS 1 10861 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 1.00
CHINA, INDIA + OTHER 4 10755 0.23 0.09 -0.36 0.49 0.93
AMERICA 4 10812 -0.05 0.12 -0.43 0.42 0.87
Notes: Table provides selected summary statistics for the key variables used in section 6 by area. Areas are either the original EFIGE area groups or
regrouped in order to increase the number of countries (#c) per area group. Specifically, China & India are grouped together with Other Areas, and USA
& Canada are grouped together with Central & South America. Corr is the correlation coefficient that relates to each projection coefficient. For a definition





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
∆logRxcst -0.161* 0.0456 -0.150 -0.123 -0.167
(0.0962) (0.126) (0.160) (0.368) (0.149)
∆logRxcst × XScsi 0.859*** 0.872*** 0.856*** 0.859*** 0.760*** 0.758*** 0.731*** 0.760*** 0.894*** 0.737***
(0.165) (0.165) (0.172) (0.165) (0.217) (0.217) (0.215) (0.217) (0.162) (0.210)
∆logRxcst × IScsi 0.160 0.662** 0.158 2.683** 0.551** 1.083*** 0.537** 2.639** 0.178 0.540**
(0.189) (0.290) (0.189) (1.045) (0.211) (0.318) (0.210) (1.218) (0.192) (0.218)
∆logRxcst × IScsi × f (Proj
didx
cs ) -2.939*** -1.028*** -2.934*** -2.939*** -2.432* -1.077*** -2.400* -2.432* -1.424* -1.435**
(1.121) (0.359) (1.124) (1.121) (1.283) (0.369) (1.280) (1.283) (0.738) (0.708)
∆logRxcst × FHcsi -0.0113 -0.117
(0.137) (0.108)





















µcsit yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
∆log(Assetscsit) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Fixed Effects γi + γt γi + γt γi + γt γi + γt γi + γcst γi + γcst γi + γcst γi + γcst γi + γt γi + γcst
Cluster (Firm) yes yes yes yes no no no no yes no
Cluster (Sector#Country) no no no no yes yes yes yes no yes
Nr. of Clusters 8641 8641 8641 8641 153 153 153 153 8641 153
Adj. R2 0.314 0.314 0.314 0.314 0.343 0.343 0.343 0.343 0.314 0.343
Observations 59,747 59,747 59,747 59,747 59,491 59,491 59,491 59,491 59,747 59,491
Notes: Observations relate to firm i in year t, where firms are based in country c and active in sector s. The dependent variable Salescsit represents
total sales of firm i in year t. ∆logRxcst are annual log-changes of the country and sector specific export weighted real effective exchange rate.
XScsi and IScsi denote the firm specific export and import share respectively. P̂roj
didx
cs is a demeaned version of Proj
didx
cs , the elasticity of the
import weighted with respect to the export weighted real effective exchange rate. In specifications (9) and (10), the real effective exchange rate
is replaced by the nominal effective exchange rate Excst, and the measure of co-movement is constructed accordingly. FHcsi is a dummy variable
indicating whether firm i is using financial hedges. µcsit is a markup control defined in the appendix. ∆log(Assetscsit) is the log-change in
total assets. γcs are country-sector fixed effects, γt are year fixed effects, γi are firm fixed effects and γcst are country-sector-year fixed effects.
The sector level is defined at the 2-digit US SIC level. All specifications contain the full set of relevant sub-interaction terms and level effects.
Standard errors are clustered either at the firm level or at the country-sector level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table A.6: Extension
Materialcostcsit Pro f itscsit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆logRxcst 0.248* 0.625*** -0.0407 0.422**
(0.147) (0.200) (0.153) (0.213)
∆logRxcst × XScsi 0.729*** 0.748*** 0.593* 0.589* 1.327*** 1.336*** 1.368*** 1.369***
(0.242) (0.242) (0.317) (0.318) (0.287) (0.286) (0.363) (0.363)
∆logRxcst × IScsi -0.0275 0.576 0.685** 1.296*** -0.0717 -0.257 0.0892 -0.0699
(0.305) (0.464) (0.304) (0.413) (0.327) (0.496) (0.337) (0.584)
∆logRxcst × IScsi × f (Proj
didx
cs ) -2.605 -1.112* -2.376 -1.195** -0.359 0.311 -0.0534 0.243
(1.679) (0.580) (1.861) (0.540) (1.825) (0.617) (1.702) (0.666)

















µcsit yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
∆log(Assetscsit) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Fixed Effects γi + γt γi + γt γi + γcst γi + γcst γi + γt γi + γt γi + γcst γi + γcst
Cluster (Firm) yes yes no no yes yes no no
Cluster (Sector#Country) no no yes yes no no yes yes
Nr. of Clusters 8641 8641 153 153 8641 8641 153 153
Adj. R2 0.219 0.219 0.244 0.244 0.218 0.218 0.230 0.230
Observations 59,747 59,747 59,491 59,491 59,747 59,747 59,491 59,491
Notes: Observations relate to firm i in year t, where firms are based in country c and active in sector s. The dependent variables
Materialcostcsit and Pro f itscsit represent total ma sales of firm i in year t. ∆logR
x
cst are annual log-changes of the country and
sector specific real effective exchange rate. XScsi and IScsi denote the firm specific export and import share respectively. P̂roj
didx
cs
is the elasticity of the import weighted with respect to the export weighted real effective exchange rate. µcsit is a markup control
defined in the appendix. ∆log(Assetscsit) is the log-change in total assets. γcs are country-sector fixed effects, γt are year fixed
effects, γi are firm fixed effects and γcst are country-sector-year fixed effects. The sector level is defined at the 2-digit US SIC
level. All specifications contain the full set of relevant sub-interaction terms and level effects. Standard errors are clustered
either at the firm level or at the country-sector level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Share of Intermediates Purchased from Abroad (Offshoring)
B: Fixed Effects Specification
Notes: The figure depicts marginal effects for different levels of offshoring (IS), evaluated for the average exporting firm (TS = 0.32) and,
respectively, at the 1st and 99th percentile of the sample distribution of P̂roj
didx
cs , i.e. the measure of co-movement between export and import
weighted real effective exchange rates. All remaining variables are evaluated at the mean. The vertical red line denotes the average share
of imported intermediates among all exporting firms in the sample (IS = 0.16). The confidence level, depicted by vertical bars along the
margins-line, is set to 95%. Panel A represents specification (5) and panel B specification (7) from table 1.
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Table A.7: Area Robustness
importercsiκ
Real: Rxcsκt Nominal: E
x
csκt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
exportercsiκ 0.0755*** 0.137** 0.0903*** 0.0700*** 0.0675*** 0.0459*** 0.171*** 0.0596*** 0.0638*** 0.0575***
(0.0168) (0.0536) (0.0163) (0.0153) (0.0173) (0.0127) (0.0315) (0.0130) (0.0140) (0.0128)
exportercsiκ × sd(X
xi
csκt)csκ -0.890*** -2.741*** -1.148*** -0.664*** -0.428*** -0.838*** -3.545*** -0.990*** -0.850*** -0.533***
(0.110) (0.412) (0.128) (0.0871) (0.120) (0.0890) (0.439) (0.0902) (0.101) (0.0974)
exportercsiκ × sd(X
xi
csκt)csκ × f (Projcsκ) 1.886*** 1.886*** 1.024*** -2.428 0.0609 2.893*** 2.893*** 1.055*** 0.798 1.191*
(0.414) (0.414) (0.172) (1.560) (0.546) (0.447) (0.447) (0.185) (0.753) (0.608)
exportercsiκ × f (Projcsκ) -0.0630 -0.0630 -0.0893*** 0.430*** 0.0817 -0.134*** -0.134*** -0.0855*** 0.0362 -0.0175
(0.0587) (0.0587) (0.0190) (0.166) (0.0768) (0.0324) (0.0324) (0.0172) (0.0504) (0.0473)














csκ > 0 ĉorrcsκ P̂roj
didx
csκ
exportercsiκ × controlscsκ yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Fixed Effects γcsκ + γi γcsκ + γi γcsκ + γi γcsκ + γi γcsκ + γi γcsκ + γi γcsκ + γi γcsκ + γi γcsκ + γi γcsκ + γi
Cluster (Firm) 11225 11225 11225 11225 10989 11225 11225 11225 11225 10989
Cluster (Sector#Country#Area) 1008 1008 1008 1008 756 1008 1008 1008 1008 756
Adj. R2 0.335 0.335 0.336 0.335 0.244 0.336 0.336 0.336 0.335 0.245
Observations 86,934 86,934 86,934 86,934 64,841 86,934 86,934 86,934 86,934 64,841
Notes: Observations relate to firm i in area κ, where firms are based in country c and active in sector s. The dependent variable importercsiκ is an indicator equal to one if
the firm is sourcing intermediates from region κ. exportercsiκ is an indicator equal to one if the firm is exporting to region κ. X
xi
csκt ∈ R, E is either the real or the nominal
real effective exchange rate in area κ at time t. sd(Xxicsκt)csκ is the standard deviation of the monthly export and import weighted, area κ specific real or nominal effective
exchange rate, measured over the full sample period. P̂roj
didx
csκ is the demeaned elasticity of the import weighted with respect to the export weighted area κ specific real
or nominal effective exchange rate Projdidxcsκ . ĉorrcsκ is the demeaned correlation coefficient between the import weighted and the export weighted real or nominal effective
exchange rate. controlscsκ include: 1. reg. f inal-export sharecsκ is the share of final good exports to area κ in all final good exports (4-digit). 2. rel. io-wage (p.C.)csκ is the
wage per employee in intermediate input industries in area κ relative to country c (2-digit). 3. rel. io-lab.prod.csκ is the value added per employee in intermediate input
industries in area κ relative to country c (2-digit). 4. Grubel-Lloydcsκ is the Grubel-Lloyed Index of industry s for trade with area κ (4-digit). γκ are area fixed effects, γi are
firm fixed effects and γcsκ are country-sector-area fixed effects. The sector level is defined at the 2-digit US SIC level. Specification (5) and (10) exclude the EU15 area and
Other Asia Countries. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and at the sector-country-area level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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